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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) effectively ended most
restrictions on the use of written offering materials in public distributions of securities.
Previously, the only written offering materials that could be used in such distributions
were terse announcements and dense statutory prospectuses that constituted the bulk of
the registration statements that issuers had to file with the SEC. These restrictions did not
depend on the accuracy of the information in the communications, so other written
communications could not be used even if completely accurate. Less formal written
offering material, known as free writing, could be distributed at the end of the offering
process, but even then only to investors who had previously been sent a copy of the final
statutory prospectus.
I. Maurice Wormser Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. I am grateful to Richard Squire, Hillary Sale,
Dan Richman, Adam Pritchard, Alex Notopoulos, Don Langevoort, Bob Hillman, Sean Griffith, Jill Fisch, Bill
Farrar, Meredith Cross and Julie Constantinides for their help with this article.
The Journal of Corporation Law
Under the Commission's new regime, all sorts of written material may be distributed
much earlier in the offering process, and participants in most public offerings are relieved
of any obligation to deliver statutory prospectuses. The SEC adopted its new rules to
simplify the offering process and to eliminate delays in the dissemination of information
to investors.' To accomplish these ends, it created a new disclosure device-modeled on
free writing-which it calls the free writing prospectus. Participants in a public offering
may now, from a very early date, widely disseminate free writing prospectuses-
containing almost any kind of information in whatever form they choose-and often
without any requirement that they deliver a statutory prospectus at all.
Although these reforms eliminated the prohibition on distributing informal written
offering materials before a registration statement becomes effective, few market
participants are using free writing prospectuses that differ substantially from
communications they were using before the reforms were adopted. This is not because
they do not know about the new regime. On the contrary, the securities industry and its
lawyers were keenly interested in the SEC's reform agenda. From the time the reforms
were first floated, however, they warned that reform would have limited traction if
security buyers were permitted to rescind their purchases under section 12(a)(2) 2 of the
Securities Act of 19333 in the event the newly permitted communications contained false
statements. Nonetheless, the Commission insisted that such liability would attach, and in
fact acted to make issuers liable under section 12(a)(2) for some misleading free writing
prospectuses used by other market participants. Not surprisingly, the specter of liability
for inadvertent and third party misrepresentations has kept security sellers from using the
newly permitted free writing prospectuses widely. Since the reforms were adopted, the
techniques of disclosure have changed, but the content of disclosure has remained largely
the same. Indeed, the greatest practical change resulting from the reforms is an almost
universal practice of offering participants agreeing among themselves to restrict the use
of free writing prospectuses by any of them. Accordingly, the reforms have fallen short of
their stated goals of facilitating communication, simplifying the registration process, and
reducing the cost of raising capital.
In this Article, I argue that free writing prospectuses containing false statements
should not be subject to liability under section 12(a)(2) unless they are widely distributed
before a final statutory prospectus is available. Outside that context, such liability serves
no good end, but simply complicates the offering process, impedes the flow of
information, harms market participants, including innocent investors, and burdens the
capital formation process generally. These conclusions do not depend on any particularly
controversial view of market efficiency or morality, but follow from the very premises
that led the SEC to permit free writing prospectuses in the first place. Moreover,
1. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act Release No. 52,056,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,731-32 (Aug. 3, 2005) [hereinafter
Securities Offering Reform].
2. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2000). When section 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 771(b) (2000), was added to the
Securities Act in 1995, what had been section 12(2) was redesignated section 12(a)(2). Public Secunties
Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 109, 109 Stat. 737, 757 (1995); see also infra note 51 and
accompanying text. For the sake of clarity, 1 have generally referred to both old section 12(2) and current
section 12(a)(2) as section 12(a)(2).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000).
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Congress recognized as much in 1933.
As noted above, Congress-not the SEC-created the concept of free writing when
it permitted those selling securities to distribute statutory free writing after a registration
statement became effective. A limiting clause in section 12(a)(2)-one that has seldom
been noted and, when noted has generally been misunderstood-exempts statutory free
writing from the section. As this Article shows, exempting free writing that contains false
statements from section 12(a)(2) led to the broad dissemination of accurate information in
the far more powerful form of the statutory prospectus. The same exemption should be
extended to most free writing prospectuses.
Part II of this Article analyzes the treatment of written offering materials under the
registration provisions of the Securities Act, with particular attention to traditional free
writing and the new free writing prospectuses. Part III examines the application of section
12(a)(2) to free writing. Misrepresentations made in the public offer or sale of securities
are actionable under section 12(a)(2) except when they are contained in free writing.4
Although this loophole is generally taken to be a drafting error, it is in fact an extremely
effective mechanism for accomplishing the goals of the Securities Act. The Securities
Act's mandatory disclosure scheme has one great weakness. Although the Act requires
security issuers to file elaborate statutory prospectuses with the SEC, it does not require
them or anyone else to provide those prospectuses to prospective investors. The free
writing loophole addressed this problem. By permitting written offering material to be
used without fear of section 12(a)(2) liability, but only if it is accompanied or preceded
by a final prospectus containing the information in an effective registration statement, the
Act created a powerful and necessary incentive for offering participants to distribute
statutory prospectuses voluntarily. Paradoxically, privileging false statements in free
writing was the key to achieving widespread distribution of the Securities Act's central
information document.
Part IV extends the analysis to the new free writing prospectuses, which are subject
to section 12(a)(2) liability. It criticizes the SEC's ham-handed attempt to extend section
12(a)(2) liability to issuers that sell through underwriters, and questions the SEC's
authority to permit the use of free writing prospectuses in the manner in which it did.
After showing that the SEC could have permitted the use of free writing prospectuses-
albeit by an approach the Commission chose not to take-it then addresses the SEC's
decision to subject free writing prospectuses to section 12(a)(2) liability. While the
justification for exempting free writing from section 12(a)(2) does not apply perfectly to
free writing prospectuses, the very changes in market structure and communications
practices that led the Commission to permit the use of free writing prospectuses also
indicate that free writing prospectuses that are not widely disseminated before a final
statutory prospectus is available should be exempt from section 12(a)(2) as well.
The Article concludes with a reappraisal of Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,5 in which the
Supreme Court held that section 12(a)(2) applies only in public offerings. 6 Gustafson is
the most important authority on section 12(a)(2), and by all accounts the worst securities
law opinion ever written. While the Supreme Court's analysis cannot be defended, the
4. See infra Part 1ll.
5. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
6. Id. at 584 (holding that section 12(a)(2) does not extend to a private sale contract).
2008]
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regulatory structure it created may be more consistent with the structure and evident
purpose of the Securities Act than has generally been recognized.
II. PROSPECTUSES, FREE WRITING, AND FREE WRITING PROSPECTUSES
A. Prospectuses
The Securities Act is built around section 5,7 which makes it unlawful to offer a
security for sale in interstate commerce until the issuer has filed a registration statement
containing extensive information about the security being offered, its issuer and the terms
of the offering, and also makes it unlawful to sell a security until the registration
statement becomes effective. 8 Thus, absent an exemption from section 5, no offer of
securities, written or otherwise, may be made until the issuer has filed a registration
statement for those securities. The Securities Act defines the term "offer" quite broadly to
include any attempt to dispose of a security for value,9 so until a registration statement is
filed section 5 prohibits people who are planning to distribute securities to the public
from making almost any statement, written or oral, relating to those securities.
After a registration statement is filed, written and oral communications are subject to
substantially different regulation. Oral offers may be made without restriction, but written
offers are problematic because the filing of a registration statement triggers restrictions
on the use of prospectuses. With a few important exceptions discussed below, l ° any
written offer (as broadly defined) is a prospectus. " Section 5(b)(1) of the Securities Act
makes it unlawful to use jurisdictional means to transmit a prospectus after a registration
statement has been filed unless that prospectus meets the requirements of section 10 of
the Act. 2 Given the Act's broad definition of prospectus, this means that almost any
written communication used to sell a security must meet the requirements of section 10.
Section 10 is dense, but essentially it provides that a prospectus must contain or
summarize the information in the registration statement. Section 10 contains two
alternative sets of requirements,' 3 one in section 10(a) and the other in section 10(b).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
8. Id.
9. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2000); see also Guidelines for the Release of
Information by Issuers Whose Securities Are in Registration, Securities Act Release No. 5180, 36 Fed. Reg.
16,506 (Aug. 20, 1971) ("[T]he publication of information and statements, and publicity efforts, made in
advance of a proposed financing which have the effect of conditioning the public mind or arousing public
interest in the issuer or in its securities constitutes an offer.").
10. See infra Part II.B (explaining that free writing is not a prospectus).
11. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2000) (providing the definition of
prospectus).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (2000) ("It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ... to make
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to
carry or transmit any prospectus relating to any security with respect to which a registration statement has been
filed under this title, unless such prospectus meets the requirements of section 10.").
13. Although section 10 speaks in commanding terms ("a prospectus ... shall contain" information in a
registration statement), or, as the Supreme Court put it in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995),
with an unqualified mandate, the use of a prospectus that does not meet the requirements of section 10 does not
violate section 10. Instead, it violates section 5(b), which requires that prospectuses used in certain
circumstances must meet the requirements of section 10. Conversely, if section 5(b) is not triggered, because
the offer at issue is exempt or jurisdictional means are not used, section 10 is not triggered. In other words,
[Vol. 33:4
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Prior to the adoption of the 2005 reforms, only elaborate documents prepared with great
precision and diligence, and almost always carefully vetted by lawyers, met either set of
requirements.
Section 10(a) provides that a prospectus must contain the information contained in
the registration statement, but may omit any information that the SEC determines is not
necessary. 14 Section 10(c) empowers the Commission to require any prospectus to
contain additional information that it determines is necessary or appropriate. 15 Taken
together, these two provisions mean that to meet the requirements of section 10(a), a
prospectus must contain the information in the registration statement less whatever the
SEC permits to be omitted plus whatever the SEC requires to be included.
Section 10(b) directs the SEC to permit a prospectus that summarizes or omits all or
part of the information in a section 10(a) prospectus. 16 Inasmuch as section 10(a) itself
empowers the Commission to authorize information in a registration statement to be
omitted from a prospectus, it is not entirely clear how section 10(b) expands the SEC's
section 10(a) authority over the content of a prospectus. Nonetheless, there are important
differences between prospectuses that meet the requirements of section 10(a) and those
that meet the requirements of section 10(b).
A section 10(a) prospectus is subject to much harsher liabilities than a section 10(b)
prospectus. A section 10(a) prospectus is filed as part of the registration statement to
which it relates-indeed, it constitutes the bulk of the registration statement.17 A section
10(b) prospectus need not be so filed if the SEC so provides by rule. More importantly, as
part of the registration statement, a section 10(a) prospectus is subject to section 11,18 the
Draconian liability provision that subjects issuers, directors, underwriters and, in some
instances, accountants and other experts, to liability for false statements in a registration
statement when it becomes effective. In contrast, a section 10(b) prospectus, whether
filed or not, is not part of the registration statement for purposes of section 11, and thus is
not subject to section 11 liability. On the other hand, a section 10(a) prospectus is more
useful to distribution participants than a section 10(b) prospectus. If a security is
delivered after sale, it must be accompanied or preceded by a section 10(a) prospectus. 19
section 10 acting alone does not make anything unlawful or actionable. See I Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION § 2.B.1 (3d ed. 1989 & Supp. 2007). This understanding of section 10 is so
commonplace that it is seldom explicitly stated. Its accuracy can be illustrated by the case of a prospectus used
in connection with an exempt private placement, see Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000),
for which "compliance" with section 10 would be impossible inasmuch as there is no registration statement, and
for which there is no explicit exemption from section 10 (section 4(2) is an exemption only from section 5). The
failure to recognize this statutory technique explains much of the confusion in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Gustafson.
14. Securities Act of 1933 § 10(a)(1), (4), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(1), (4) (2000).
15. Securities Act of 1933 § 10(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(c) (2000).
16. Securities Act of 1933 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (2000).
17. As first enacted, section 10 required that the prospectus contain "the same statements contained in the
registration statement," but in 1954 it was amended to require the prospectus to "contain the information
contained in the registration statement," in both cases with the exception of certain items and any other
information as provided by the Commission. Compare Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 10(a), 48 Stat. 74, 81 (1933) with
§ 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(10)(a). Section 10(a) prospectuses are now filed as part of the registration statement.
See Rules 401, 404, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.401, 230.404 (2007).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000).
19. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (2000). But cf Rule 153, 17 C.F.R. § 230.153
2008]
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More critically (especially inasmuch as securities are seldom delivered anyway), only a
section 10(a) prospectus can serve as a basis for statutory free writing.
B. Free Writing
Fortunately for those subject to section 5 regulation, not every written offer of a
security is a prospectus. The Securities Act's definition of prospectus excludes two
classes of written offers. Moreover, the SEC has used its residual rulemaking power to
declare that certain forms of written offering material are not prospectuses, even though
they would otherwise fall within the definition.
The first statutory exclusion from the definition of prospectus is free writing. After a
registration statement becomes effective, a written offer is not a prospectus if it is
accompanied or preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements of section 10(a) at
the time it is sent.20 Thus the use of free writing-written offering material used after the
effective date of a registration statement and accompanied or preceded by a prospectus
that meets the requirements of section 10(a)-does not violate section 5(b)(1), since
section 5(b)(1) requires only that prospectuses satisfy section 10. In other words, free
writing may be used without running afoul of section 5(b)(1), because free writing is not
a prospectus, not because it is a prospectus that meets the requirements of section 10.
Because the use of free writing does not trigger section 5(b)(1), the form and content of
free writing is not constrained by the section: after a registration statement becomes
effective, any written offering material may be sent to prospective investors without
concern for section 5 so long as a prospectus meeting the requirements of section 10(a) is
sent first.
The other statutory exclusion from the definition of prospectus is the so-called
tombstone or identifying statement, which is a notice containing a very limited amount of
information and identifying a person from whom a prospectus meeting the requirements
of section 10 may be obtained.2' The SEC may permit identifying statements to contain
other information, and it has gradually expanded the permissible contents of identifying
statements.22 Nonetheless, tombstones and identifying statements are subject to rigid
formal requirements and generally may contain only information about the offering and
not information about the issuer of the securities.23
As noted above, the SEC has also used its statutory authority to define technical
terms contained in the Securities Act 24 to exclude certain forms of written offering
material from the definition of prospectus.25 Although this technique of exclusion has
important benefits, and the range of communications excluded from the definition of
prospectus by this route has grown over time, only a limited set of communications that
would otherwise be within the statutory definition of prospectus are excluded by virtue of
(2007) (relaxing the delivery requirement).
20. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(10)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(l0)(a) (2000).
21. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(10)(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10)(b) (2000). Tombstones are typically
published as stark advertisements in the financial press.
22. See Rule 134, 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (2007) (providing permissible contents of identifying statements).
23. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(10)(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10)(b) (2000).
24. Securities Act of 1933 § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2000).
25. See, e.g., Rules 134a, 134b, 138, 139, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.134a, 230.134b, 230.138, 230.139 (2007)
(describing written materials that are not included in the definition of "prospectus").
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SEC definitional rules.
Notwithstanding these exceptions from the broad definition of prospectus, until the
SEC adopted its offering reform rules in 2005, most written communications that
constituted statutory offers had to meet the requirements of section 10, unless they
qualified as free writing. Thus, during the waiting period between the time a registration
statement was filed and the time it became effective, the primary form of written offering
communication was the preliminary prospectus, which includes most of the information
required in the registration statement, but not the sale price of the security and
information dependent on that price, such as total proceeds.26 After a registration
statement becomes effective, written offering material was generally limited to the final
27and complete statutory prospectus and free writing preceded by such a prospectus.
C. Free Writing Prospectuses
The 2005 offering reform rules substantially revised the regime governing the
dissemination of information in securities distributions registered under the Securities
Act. The greatest change was the extension of the free writing concept to the period
before a registration statement becomes effective. Those proposing to sell the securities
of most issuers28 may now make written offers once a registration statement has been
filed without running afoul of section 5(b). 29 So-called well-known seasoned issuers-
large capitalization companies with a history of reporting under the Securities Exchange
26. Rule 430, 17 C.F.R. § 230.430 (2007). It has become commonplace to state that Rule 430 was adopted
pursuant to the authority of section 10(b) and to refer to a preliminary prospectus as a section 10(b) prospectus.
See, e.g., JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 183 (5th ed. 2006); LARRY D. SODERQUIST &
THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES LAW 48 (3d ed. 2007). However, the leading treatise in the field labels the
preliminary prospectus a section 10(a) prospectus, noting that the SEC has ample authority to provide for a
preliminary prospectus without section 10(b), and that it adopted the rule that became Rule 430 without
reference to section 10(b). See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, § 2.B.5.d (discussing section 10(a) and Rule
430); see also supra text accompanying notes 15-17 (discussing SEC's section 10(a) authority). Whatever the
Commission's opinion was when it created preliminary prospectuses, it now seems to regard them as
prospectuses that do not satisfy section 10(a). See Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at 44,747 n.239
(stating that preliminary prospectuses "are not prospectuses that satisfy the requirements of Securities Act
section 10(a)").
27. See Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at 44,731 (stating "even after the registration statement
is declared effective, offering participants still may make written offers only through a statutory prospectus,"
though additional written offering materials may be used if they conform with section 10(a)).
28. Certain classes of issuers, including those that are not current on their Exchange Act reporting
requirements, blank check companies, shell companies, and penny stock companies, are generally ineligible to
use free writing prospectuses. Rule 164(e), 17 C.F.R. § 230.164(e) (2007); see also Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. §
230.405 (2007) (defining ineligible issuer). Registered investment companies and business development
companies also may not use free writing prospectuses. Rule 164(f), 17 C.F.R. § 230.164(f) (2006). The SEC
explained that they are excluded because alternative forms of abbreviated section 10(b) prospectuses are
available to them. Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at 44,746; see also Rule 482, 17 C.F.R. § 230.482
(2007) (setting requirements for investment company advertising satisfying section 10); HARVEY E. BINES &
STEVE THEL, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LAW & REGULATION § 3.03.B.4 (2d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2007)
(discussing Rule 482). The rules for investment company advertising served as a model for the 2005 reforms.
See infra Part 1V.B (detailing investment company advertising rules).
29. Rule 164(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.164(a) (2007); see also Rule 433, 17 C.F.R. § 230.433 (2007) (outlining
conditions for use of free writing prospectus).
20081
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Act 3°-may make written offers even before they file a registration statement. 31
The mechanism for this reform is the free writing prospectus, which is defined by
rule as "any written communication ... that constitutes an offer to sell or a solicitation of
an offer to buy the securities relating to a registered offering., 32 Certain forms of written
offering materials are excluded from this definition, however, particularly statutory free
writing and those communications that had satisfied section 10 prior to the adoption of
the reforms.33 Thus free writing prospectuses are essentially communications that would
be statutory free writing but for the fact that they are used before a registration statement
is effective and are not accompanied or preceded by a prospectus that meets the
requirements of section 10(a). The reform rules allow free writing prospectuses to be
used without violating section 5(b)(1) by declaring that when they are used in compliance
with the rules they satisfy section 10(b).34
As noted above, well-known seasoned issuers may use free writing prospectuses
even before they file a registration statement, but other issuers may not do so until they
have filed a registration statement that contains a prospectus (other than a summary
prospectus 35 or free writing prospectus) that meets the requirements of section 10.36
Issuers must file with the SEC most free writing prospectuses that they prepare or that are
prepared on their behalf.37 Other offering participants must file free writing prospectuses
they use in a manner reasonably designed to lead to broad unrestricted dissemination.
38
Free writing prospectuses must contain a legend directing the recipient to a source
from which the registration statement and formal statutory prospectus contained therein
may be obtained.39 Thus the free writing prospectus regime follows that of statutory free
writing by requiring a link, albeit sometimes a weak one, between a free writing
prospectus and a prospectus that meets the requirements of section 10 (other than a
30. See Securities Exchange Act §§ 12, 13, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m (2000) (stating registration and
reporting requirements).
31. Rule 163, 17 C.F.R. § 230.163 (2007); see also Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2007) (defining well-
known seasoned issuer). Well-known seasoned issuers represent about 30% of public companies and about 95%
of the U.S. equity market. Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at 44,727.
32. Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2007).
33. Id.
34. Rules 164(a), 433(a), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.164(a), 230.433(a) (2007). The SEC's assertion of authority to
make this declaration is criticized in Part IV.B, infra. Free writing prospectuses used by well-known seasoned
issuers before a registration statement is filed are not subject to section 5(b)(1), which is triggered by the filing
of a registration. As offers, however, they would violate section 5(c) except for Commission Rule 163, 17
C.F.R. § 230.163 (2007), which simply conditionally exempts them from the section.
35. A summary prospectus is a form of prospectus authorized under section 10(b). Rule 431, 17 C.F.R. §
230.431 (2007). Summary prospectuses are seldom used. 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, § 2.B.5.e.
36. Rule 433(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(b)(1) (2007).
37. Rule 433(d)(1)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(d)(1)(i) (2007). If a well-known seasoned issuer uses a free
writing prospectus before a registration statement is filed, it must file such prospectus with the SEC promptly
upon filing a registration statement. Rule 163(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.163(b)(2) (2007).
38. Rule 433(d)(1)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(d)(1)(ii) (2007). All free writing prospectuses that are not filed
with the SEC must be retained for three years. Rule 433(d), (g), 17 C.F.R, § 230.433(d), (g) (2007).
39. Rule 433(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(c)(2) (2007). If the free writing prospectus is used by or on behalf
of a well-known seasoned issuer before a registration statement is filed, the legend must state that a registration
statement may be filed and identify where the registration statement and prospectus contained therein may be
obtained once it is filed. Rule 163(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.163(b)(1) (2007).
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summary prospectus or a free writing prospectus). 40 The strength of the required link
varies with the amount of information independently available about the issuer, and
reflects the SEC's "access equals delivery" model, in which investors are presumed to
have access to the Internet, and a prospectus is "delivered" by posting it on a web site.4'
In this respect, free writing prospectuses resemble tombstones and identifying statements
more than statutory free writing, in that in most cases what is required is not delivery of a
statutory prospectus but the identification of a source from whom such a prospectus may
be obtained, and in all cases the linked statutory prospectus need only meet the
requirements of section 10(b), not the presumably more exacting requirements of section
10(a).
Well-known seasoned issuers and seasoned issuers (i.e., those with a one-year
history of reporting under the Exchange Act and a specified market capitalization 42) may
use a free writing prospectus without delivering a statutory prospectus first,43 although, as
just noted, the free writing prospectus must identify a source from which the recipient can
obtain a statutory prospectus. Free writing prospectuses of other issuers must be
accompanied or preceded by a prospectus that satisfies the requirements of section 10
(other than a summary prospectus or free writing prospectus), although if the free writing
prospectus is an electronic communication, this requirement is satisfied by an active
hyperlink to the statutory prospectus.44
The bottom line is that once a registration statement is filed, most issuers and other
offering participants may now distribute written offering material in essentially any form
they wish. Such material need not be included in the registration statement, need not
contain any of the information in the registration statement, and may include information
not contained in the registration statement.45 In other words, the Commission now
permits free writing to be used even before a registration statement becomes effective.
The Commission's approach to free writing is much more generous than the statute's,
except in one crucial respect. In contrast to statutory free writing, which is by definition
not a prospectus, a free writing prospectus is a prospectus; it simply (according to the
40. Rule 433(b)(2)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(b)(2)(i) (2007).
41. Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at 44,783-86; see also Rules 153, 172, 17 C.F.R. §§
230.153, 230.172 (2007) (treating public availability as delivery). Interestingly, the SEC did not make access
tantamount to delivery for purposes of defining statutory free writing, so free writing must still be preceded or
accompanied by a prospectus meeting the requirements of section 10(a). See Securities Offering Reform,
Securities Act Release No. 8501, Exchange Act Release No. 50,624, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,649, 69 Fed. Reg. 67,392, 67,408 (Nov. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Proposing Release] ("[A] free writing
prospectus that satisfies specified conditions could be used by any other issuer of offering participant .. if a
statutory prospectus precedes or accompanies the free writing prospectus .... ).
42. Seasoned issuers are issuers eligible to register securities on a Form S-3 registration statement. Issuers
may generally use Form S-3 if they have been reporting companies under the Exchange Act for at least a year
and have a market capitalization (excluding holdings of affiliates) of at least $75 million. See Form S-3, 2 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 6023. An important advantage of the Form S-3 registration statement is that it may supply
most of the required information by incorporating Exchange Act reports by reference.
43. Rule 433(b)(2)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(b)(2)(i) (2007).
44. Id.
45. Rule 433(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(c)(1) (2007); Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at 44,744,
44,748-49. The only limitation on content is that the free writing prospectus may not conflict with information
in the registration statement or the issuer's Exchange Act reports that are incorporated into the registration
statement and not superceded or modified. Rule 433(c)(i)-(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(c)(i)-(ii) (2007).
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SEC) satisfies section 10(b). This distinction has extraordinary implications when a free
writing prospectus contains false statements or half truths.
III. FREE WRITING AND SECTION 12(a)(2)
Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act provides that
Any person who offers or sells a security. .. by the use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of
the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or
omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission, shall be liable, subject to subsection (b) of this section, to the person
purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in
any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such
security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon,
upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the
46security.
This provision, which gives security buyers the right to rescind their purchases, was
calculated not so much to protect investors injured by fraud as to make sellers careful
about what they say.4' A complaining buyer need only show that her seller used a
prospectus or oral communications that contained a false statement of material fact. The
buyer need not show that she investigated the matter or tried to learn the truth 48 (although
she must show that she did not know the statement was false).49 She need not show that
she relied on the falsehood, or, perhaps, that she even saw the misleading
50
communication. She need not show that the seller acted with scienter or even
negligence (although the seller has an affirmative defense of reasonable care). Nor need
she show that the reason her security declined in value had anything to do with the
falsehood (although section 12(b), added in 1995,51 provides an affirmative defense of
lack of loss causation). Moreover, once a false statement is made, it is very hard to take it
back. Even if the seller makes a public correction before a sale is completed, he remains
46. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2000).
47. See William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171,
173 (1933) ("The civil liabilities imposed by the [Securities] Act are not only compensatory in nature but also in
terrorem."); Harry Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 227 (1933) (similar).
48. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 356 (10th Cir. 1970) (stating that "the purchaser does not
have to prove that he could not have discovered the falsity upon reasonable investigation").
49. See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1228-29 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating that "[a]ll
that is required is ignorance of the untruth or omission"); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) (similar).
50. See Sanders, 619 F.2d at 1225-26 (stating that the plaintiff need not prove reliance or that he ever
received the misleading report).
51. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 105, 109 Stat. 737, 757
(1995).
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liable unless the buyer knew the truth at the time of her purchase.5 2
A. Free Writing Is Exempt from Section 12(a)(2)
Section 12(a)(2) contains a remarkable loophole for free writing. The section
reaches only false statements contained in "a prospectus or oral communication." Free
writing is, by definition, neither a prospectus nor an oral communication. Ergo, false
statements in free writing are not actionable under section 12(a)(2).
This syllogism may seem too clever by half. Louis Loss, the preeminent scholar of
securities regulation, insisted that the exception of free writing from section 12(a)(2) was
a mere "drafting bug" that only a Victorian judge would exalt over the "clearly
manifested statutory purpose" to allow recovery. 3 In the context of the debate over
52. See MidAmerica Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 886 F.2d 1249, 1253-57
(10th Cir. 1989) (allowing recovery under state law modeled on section 12(a)(2) on the basis of false oral
statement, even though subsequently delivered prospectus disclosed the truth); id. at 1255-57 (finding that
section 12(a)(2) would yield same result); 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, § Il-C-2, at 4194 ("But it is
possible in § 12(a)(2) to give meaning to both phrases-'offers or' and 'by means of-by grounding liability
on the use of a misleading prospectus or other document that was corrected before the sale unless it is clear that
the correction was brought to the buyer's attention before he or she bought If this analysis is correct, it
indicates the advisability of emphasizing the correction, perhaps to the extent of sending a separate letter along
with the final prospectus."). Any pre-purchase waiver of rights under section 12(a)(2) is void, Securities Act of
1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2000), and the Securities Act's anti-waiver provisions are so broad that it is
difficult to craft an enforceable agreement by which a buyer with a right of action under section 12(a)(2) agrees
to enter into a new transaction and waive its rescission rights. See Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at
44,767-68.
53. Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION § I0-E-l, at 892 n.19 (2d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter Loss, FUNDAMENTALS]. The discussion of the free writing loophole in the second edition of
Fundamentals is taken almost verbatim from the second edition of Loss's Securities Regulation. 3 Louis
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION § Il -C-l, at 1705 n. 72 (2d ed. 1961). However the current editions of
Securities Regulation and Fundamentals, both of which Loss wrote with Joel Seligman, do not seem to
mention the loophole. See generally Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13; LOUiS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION (4th ed. 2002). The discussion from the second edition of
Fundamentals is as follows:
Another problem has been raised but never decided. Section 12[(a))(2) refers to anyone who offers
or sells a secunty "by means of a prospectus or oral communication." Section 2(10)(a) provides
that in certain circumstances supplementary selling literature accompanying or following the
statutory prospectus "shall not be deemed a prospectus." What, then, if the seller uses the statutory
prospectus, which tells the truth and the whole truth, but sends supplementary literature containing
a pack of lies along with or after the official prospectus? The question has not been litigated.
Although a Victorian court might have considered itself helpless, it seems hard to believe that
many judges today would so exalt a "drafting bug" over the clear legislative intention as to deny
recovery. The obvious escape, once more, is that § 2 defines various terms, including "prospectus,"
"unless the context otherwise requires." In § 12[(a)](2) the context most certainly requires that
supplementary selling literature be considered a "prospectus." Some support for this construction is
found in the 1954 amendments of § 2(10)(a) .... Actually it would have been better to amend §
12[(a)](2) itself than to insert the parenthetical language in § 2(10)(a); for the latter solution invites
an expressio unius argument to the effect that supplementary literature other than a § 10(b)
summary prospectus is not a "prospectus" for purposes of § 12[(a)](2). Even so, however, the
clearly manifested statutory purpose in § 12[(a)](2) should prevail over an argument drawn purely
from the words of the statute.
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whether section 12(a)(2) extended beyond public offerings that culminated in Gustafson,
another commentator wrote:
Whatever else one may believe about the transactions to which section
12[(a)](2) applies, it seems inconceivable that Congress intended to exempt
"free writing," and only "free writing," from the liability consequences that
attach to all other material misrepresentation, whether written or oral, made by
a seller in a public offering.54
Notwithstanding the evident confidence with which these comments were made,
nothing in the Securities Act manifests, clearly or otherwise, a purpose to reach free
writing, and it is in fact quite conceivable that Congress intended to exempt free writing,
and only free writing, from section 12(a)(2). In any event, we ought not lightly assume
that free writing was excluded from section 12(a)(2) by mistake.
While the Securities Act is tough reading, no one doubts that it was carefully
written. 55 The Securities Act was drafted by a famously able group, led by Felix
Frankfurter, later of the Supreme Court, and James Landis, who was later to serve as
chair of the SEC and dean of Harvard Law School. Frankfurter, Landis, and the people
working with them likely paid particular attention to the language of a critically
important part of the statute that imposed remarkably burdensome liability. In fact, when
Landis started to work on the Securities Act, he was by his own account particularly
concerned with "the nature and variety of the sanctions available to government to bring
about conformance with its statutory mandates. 56 Indeed, in the debate over the
application of section 12(a)(2) to private placements and secondary market transactions,
Professor Loss himself emphasized the intricate drafting style employed by the "able
draftsmen" (his word) of the Securities Act, and insisted that courts should respect the
use of the defined term prospectus in section 12(a)(2) (although he did not mention the
drafting bug this time).5 7
Another reason to reject the notion that the word prospectus was used carelessly in
section 12(a)(2), and to recognize instead that it was intended to carry its defined
Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra, § 10-E-1, at 892 n.19.
Another securities law treatise, on the subject of free writing, states simply that "[ilt must not be
forgotten, however, that unduly optimistic promotional sales talk will render the supplemental sales literature in
violation of the anti-fraud provisions of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts," citing to a section covenng, inter alia,
section 12(a)(2), wherein there is no mention of the free writing loophole. 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 2.5[2), at 109-10 (4th ed. 2002).
54. Elliott J. Weiss, The Courts Have It Right: Securities Act Section 12(2) Applies Only to Public
Offerings, 48 Bus. LAW. 1, 14 (1992). Weiss argued that the phrase "by means of a prospectus or oral
communication" limited the scope of section 12(a)(2) to public offerings, predicting the limitation the Supreme
Court adopted in Gustafson. Id. at 3. He based his conclusion in part on the argument that since Congress could
not have intended to exclude free writing from the scope of section 12(a)(2), it could not have intended the term
prospectus in section 12(a)(2) to have the same meaning as in section 2(a)(10). Id. at 14-16.
55. Securities Act of 1933 section 12(a)(2) has become particularly complicated. See Louis Loss,
Securities Act § 12(2): A Rebuttal, 48 Bus. LAW. 47, 47 (1992) ("Blessed are the securities lawyers. For they
have demonstrated that members of the profession can play a devilishly revised game of chess.").
56. James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29, 33
(1959).
57. Louis Loss, The Assault on Securities Act § 12(2), 105 HARv. L. REv. 908, 916-17 (1992); see also
Loss, supra note 55.
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meaning (with the concept of free writing embedded in it), is that the term prospectus
operates to regulate or sanction conduct in only two provisions of the Securities Act:
sections 5 and 12(a)(2).5 8 If Congress or the drafters had intended to exclude free writing
from section 5 but not from section 12(a)(2), it would have been simpler to carve free
writing from section 5 directly rather than excluding it from the definition of prospectus.
If statutory free writing was meant to be excepted from only one provision of the Act,
there was no reason to employ the complex mechanism of limitation by definition, and
the drafters would presumably have recognized the risk of unintentional consequences
inherent in the use of a defined term.59 It certainly seems unlikely that the exclusion of
free writing from the definition of prospectus was supposed to have operative
significance in one and only one instance-section 5(b)(l)-and that the only other time
the word prospectus was used where the exclusion could be of any consequence-section
12(a)(2)-it was not supposed to apply. 60 In any event, if the drafters were committed to
using their defined term but wanted to subject free writing to section 12(a)(2), it would
have been a simple matter to modify the word "prospectus" there by adding something
like "as defined in section 2(a)(10) but without regard to the provisions of subparagraphs
(a) and (b) of that section." Congress did just that in another provision of the Securities
Act in 1996, clearly recognizing the restricted meaning of the word "prospectus" in the
Act.6'
The structure of the Securities Act and its subsequent amendments provide further
evidence that the exception of section 12(a)(2) was intentional. Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act62 is the companion provision to section 12(a)(2). 63 It makes it unlawful to
use false statements "in the offer or sale of any securities., 64 Section 17(a) is not limited
to prospectuses and oral communications, and it clearly reaches false statements in free
writing. The use of different language in the two statutory provisions directed at false
statements suggests that the exclusion of free writing from section 12(a)(2) was
58. The term prospectus also appears in sections 2(a)(10), 10, 18, 19, and 20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(10),
77J, 77r, 77s, 77t (2000).
59. In this regard, consider the Act's use of the defined term "issuer." For purposes of the Act generally,
"issuer" is defined in section 2(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(4) (1990), but for purposes of defining the term
"underwriter," and only for that purpose, the Act provides a different definition of "issuer," and emphasizes its
limited province. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(l 1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(l 1) (2000).
60. Cf Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 573 (1995) ("[W]e cannot accept the conclusion that this
single operative word [i.e., prospectus] means one thing in one section of the Act and something quite different
in another.").
61. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416
(1996) (amending section 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r(d) (2000)). Section 18 exempts so-called covered securities-
including most publicly traded securities-from registration or qualification under state Blue Sky laws. States
are prohibited from regulating issuer-prepared "offering documents." This preemption is supposed to be quite
broad, and that breadth is achieved by providing that "[t]he term 'offering document' ... has the meaning given
the term 'prospectus' in section 2[(a)](10), but without regard to the provisions of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
that section." Id. at 3420.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2000). The language of section 17(a) was the model for the better-known Rule
lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). See Milton V. Freeman, Foreword, Happy Birthday 10b-5: 50 Years of
Antifraud Regulation, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1993).
63. See Loss, supra note 57, at 914 ("Section 12(2) is, as it were, the private law analogue of section
17(a), a public law provision whose violation entails injunctive, administrative, and criminal consequences.").
64. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. 77q(a) (2000).
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intentional. If the phrase "prospectus or oral communication" means anything in section
12(a)(2)-and the absence of the phrase in section 17(a) suggests that it means
something-it means that statutory free writing is outside the scope of the section.65
The 1954 amendments to the Securities Act, which added section 10(b), show that
Congress understood that free writing was not subject to section 12(a)(2), at least in
1954.66 As part of those amendments, the definition of prospectus in section 2(a)(10) was
amended to establish that a section 10(b) prospectus is a prospectus and is not free
writing. This change necessarily reflects a congressional understanding that free writing
is exempt from liability under section 12(a)(2). The only effect of this change in the
definition of prospectus was to subject section 10(b) prospectuses to section 12(a)(2), and
the amendment was needed only because free writing is not subject thereto.67 If statutory
free writing had been subject to section 12(a)(2), it would not have been necessary to
exclude section 10(b) prospectuses from the definition of statutory free writing to ensure
that they were subject to section 12(a)(2). 68
In the end, I do not know whether the drafters, let alone members of Congress,
intended to exempt free writing from section 12(a)(2) (although I think that at least the
drafters did). 69 That is not my concem, however, and not much turns on congressional
65. In Gustafson, the majority contrasted the phrase "prospectus or oral communication" in section
12(a)(2) with the absence of any limiting language in section 17 and concluded that the phrase must have
limited the scope of section 12(a)(2). Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 576-78 (1995). The dissents had
no answer to the argument, and the majonty concluded that the phrase limited section 12(a)(2) to public
offerings. Id. at 577. A better reading is that the phrase simply exempted statutory free writing from section
12(a)(2).
66. The 1996 legislation exempting covered securities from the Blue Sky laws, see supra note 61, is
another example of Congress recognizing the implications of the exclusion of free writing from the definition of
prospectus. Cf Steve Thel, Statutory Findings and Insider Trading Regulation, 50 VAND. L. REv. 1091, 1121-
29 (1997) (discussing binding effect of legislation interpreting earlier securities legislation).
67. As noted just above, the word prospectus has operative effect in only two provisions of the Securities
Act, sections 5(b) and 12(a)(2). In 1954, section 5(b) itself was amended to provide that any section 10
prospectus may be used after a registration statement is filed, so the excision of section 10(b) prospectuses from
free writing was of no consequence for purposes of section 5(b)-section 10(b) prospectuses would satisfy
section 5(b) regardless of whether they were free writing. Thus the declaration that section 10(b) prospectuses
are not free writing was of consequence only for section 12(a)(2). However, if free writing had been subject to
section 12(a)(2), section 10(b) prospectuses would have been subject to section 12(a)(2) without the amendment
of the definition of prospectus, and the amendment of the definition of prospectus would have accomplished
nothing. The only way to make sense of the amendment is to recognize that Congress understood that free
writing is not covered by section 12(a)(2), and that it amended section 2(a)(10) to establish that section 10(b)
prospectuses are-unlike free writing-subject to section 12(a)(2). See LOss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 53,
at 892 n.19 ("Actually it would have been better to amend § 12[(a)](2) itself than to insert the parenthetical
language in § 2(10)(a); for the latter solution invites an expressio unius argument to the effect that
supplementary literature other than a § 10(b) summary prospectus is not a 'prospectus' for purposes of §
12(2).").
68. Even Professors Loss and Seligman concede that the 1954 amendment of section 2(a)(10) (the
provision that excludes statutory free writing from the definition of prospectus) was intended to assure that false
summary prospectuses would be actionable under section 12(a)(2). See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13,
section 2-B-6, at 498 n.263. The 1996 legislation exempting covered securities from the Blue Sky laws, see
supra note 61, is another example of Congress recognizing the implications of the exclusion of free writing
from the definition of prospectus.
69. The available legislative history is mixed. One passage in the House Report on the Securities Act,
dealing with the definition of prospectus, suggests that free writing would be actionable under section 12(a)(2).
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intent here anyway. The law is the law, and statutory free writing is explicitly excluded
from section 12(a)(2). 70 False free writing has not been held actionable under section
12(a)(2) in any reported case, 7 1 and apparently no plaintiff has ever even claimed that
false free writing is actionable under the section. Whatever Congress intended, the
important question now is whether the exception of free writing from section 12(a)(2)
makes good sense and accomplishes important ends. The treatment of free writing under
section 12(a)(2) should instruct the treatment of free writing prospectuses.
H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 13 (1933) ("From the definition of 'prospectus' two exceptions are made: The first
allows dealers, after they have opened negotiations with a prospective purchaser by giving him the required
prospectus, to give him such additional information as they may deem desirable. This additional information, of
course, by virtue of the provisions contained in sections 12[(a)](2) and [I 7](a)(2) must not contain fraudulent
statements or statements that are themselves untrue."). Another passage, in a section entitled "Civil Liabilities,"
suggests that false free writing is not actionable Id. at 9 ("The committee emphasizes that these liabilities [i.e.,
sections 11 and 12] attach only when there has been an untrue statement of material fact or an omission to state
a material fact in the registration statement or the prospectus-the basic information by which the public is
solicited.").
70. While the SEC does not seem to have publicly acknowledged that free writing is exempt from section
12(a)(2) because free writing is not a prospectus, it has recognized that identifying statements are exempt for
that reason. If identifying statements are exempt because they are not prospectuses, it follows that free writing is
exempt for the same reason.
When the SEC proposed the amendment of the Investment Company Act that Congress ultimately
adopted as Investment Company Act section 24 (g), see infra Part IV.B.2., the Division of Investment
Management rejected the alternative of allowing greater use of advertising by mutual funds under section
2(a)(10)(b), precisely because it feared that a communication that is by definition not a prospectus is not subject
to section 12(a)(2) liability:
[S]ection 12[(a)](2) by its terms applies only to prospectuses (both statutory and otherwise) and
oral communications [citing the discussion contained in Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 53,
with "But see" signal]. Thus, sponsors, issuers and underwriters using misleading tombstones
probably are subject to private liability only if they act fraudulently or recklessly [citing rule lOb-
51.
Div. OF INV. MGMT, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N., PROTECTING INVESTORS STUDY: A HALF CENTURY OF
INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 359 (1992) [hereinafter PROTECTING INVESTORS].
71. Judge Easterbrook has suggested that false statements in free writing are not actionable under any
provision of the securities laws, including Rule 10b-5, when the statutory prospectus contains the truth:
The '33 Act permits issuers, underwriters, and dealers to engage in "free writing" once the
registration statement becomes effective, and to fumish promotional literature to investors provided
that literature is accompanied or preceded by a prospectus .... Only the registration statement need
be self-contained. A prospectus is a subset of the information contained in the registration
statement, and the sales brochures are a subset of the information in the prospectus (plus the
customary effort to sell the securities). If the sales literature had to contain all the warnings that
appear in the prospectus, the privilege of distributing supplemental sales literature would be all but
meaningless. Federal law establishes a regime in which the prospectus contains the comprehensive
description of the securities. Other literature can be brief precisely because an inquiring investor
has the prospectus to turn to. Federal law also establishes a rule for resolving conflicts: in the event
statements in sales brochures and the prospectus do not agree, the prospectus wins .... If the
investor already possesses information sufficient to call [a] representation into question, he cannot
claim later that he relied on or was deceived by the lie."... Failure to disclose important things in
supplemental literature is not fraud when those things appear in the prospectus.
Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1131-32 (7th Cir. 1003) (citation omitted).
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B. Congress Was Wise to Exempt Free Writing from Section 12(a)(2)
Given the circumstances that led to enactment of the Securities Act, one might have
expected Congress to have prohibited free writing instead of privileging it.72 Part of the
reason for excepting statutory free writing from section 12(a)(2) is that, by definition,
free writing must be preceded by a prospectus that meets the requirements of section
10(a). Thus anyone receiving free writing probably has a complete statutory prospectus
as well (at least one has to have been sent to her, and prior to 1954 she had to have
received one).73 An investor with a statutory prospectus is less likely to be misled by false
free writing, and thus might reasonably be deprived of the benefit of section 12(a)(2)'s
exceptional remedy. This is an important insight, but it does not alone explain the special
treatment of free writing in section 12(a)(2). To understand the exemption of free writing
from section 12(a)(2), one has to explain why free writing is allowed at all.
The special status of free writing-under section 5 as well as under section
12(a)(2)-makes sense in light of the peculiar fact that the Securities Act does not require
that statutory prospectuses be provided to security buyers. A central purpose of the Act
was to regulate promotional activities and to make the statutory prospectus the central
element of whatever promotion occurs,74 and it has become conventional to speak of
prospectus delivery requirements. 75 However the Securities Act requires only that issuers
file a statutory prospectus as part of a registration statement; it does not require them to
use it. The Securities Act was enacted in a different constitutional era, and perhaps
because of this it foregoes legislative command and simply attaches conditions to the use
76of interstate commerce. The statute simply provides that ifa written offer is made, the
72. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 8 (1933).
[H]igh-pressure technique has assumed an undue importance in the eyes of the present generation
of securities distributors . . . and must be discarded because the resulting injury to an
underinformed public demonstrably hurts the Nation. It is furthermore the considered judgment of
this committee that any issue which cannot stand the test of a waiting inspection over a month's
average of economic conditions, but must be floated within a few days upon the crest of a possibly
manipulated market fluctuation, is not a security which deserves protection at the cost of the public
Id.
73. Until 1954, free writing was excepted from the definition of prospectus only if the user proved that a
section 10 prospectus had been received by the recipient from the sender of the free writing or his principal.
Securities Act section 2(10), 48 Stat. 74, 75 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2000)).
74. Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at 44,782 n.552 ("'Congress intended that the prospectus
provide investors with 'the means of understanding the intricacies of the transaction * * *.'") (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 73-85, at 8 (1933)); 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, § 2.B.2.d.
75. See, e.g., Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at 44,782 ("Current Prospectus Delivery
Requirements[:] The Securities Act requires delivery of a prospectus meeting the requirements of Securities Act
Section 10(a), known as a 'final prospectus,' to each investor in a registered offering.").
76. See H.R. REP. No.73-85, at 10 (1933).
The constitutionality of the imposition of liabilities of the character provided by [sections 11 and
12 of the Securities Act] raises no serious question. Even though the activities of the particular
persons concerned may be actually intrastate in character, they are, nevertheless, an integral part of
a process calling for the interstate distribution of securities. Liability is imposed upon them as a
condition of the acquisition of the privilege to do business through the channels of interstate or
foreign commerce.
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first written offer must be the statutory prospectus.77 The great irony of the Securities Act
is that registered securities may be sold without ever delivering a prospectus. 78
The device of free writing fills this lacuna. By permitting distribution participants to
use free writing if, but only if, they send a statutory prospectus, the Securities Act creates
a powerful incentive for them to send potential investors section 10(a) prospectuses
voluntarily and before investment decisions are made, since once they do they can send
their prospects anything else they want. The effectiveness of this incentive depends
critically on statutory free writing being exempt from section 12(a)(2). If it were not, the
prospect of distributing free writing would not likely induce anyone to distribute a
statutory prospectus.
The exception of free writing from section 12(a)(2) appears, then, not to be a
drafting bug, but a critical part of a mechanism for getting statutory prospectuses
distributed. Free writing is not carved out of the definition of prospectus simply so that it
may be distributed without violating section 5(b)-Congress had no reason to permit free
writing except to encourage the distribution of section 10 prospectuses. The exclusion of
free writing from the definition of prospectus allows free writing to be used without fear
of section 12(a)(2) liability, thus assuring that the right to distribute free writing is an
attractive incentive to distribute section 10(a) prospectuses. The legislative payoff for
excluding free writing from the definition of prospectus is the exception of free writing
from section 12(a)(2). The other (and better known) consequence of the definitional
exclusion-the exception of free writing from section 5(b)-is not so much an end in
itself as merely a necessary mechanical step to get the incentive scheme to work. 79
Id.
77. The SEC has long used its administrative power to push issuers and dealers to distribute statutory
prospectuses. See Rule 460, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (2006) (making distribution of preliminary prospectuses to
underwriters and participating dealers a condition of acceleration of the effectiveness of registration statement);
Rule 15(c)2-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8 (2007) (requiring dealers to distribute preliminary prospectuses before
confirming sales). The Commission's 2005 reforms, however, suggest that it is no longer so concerned. See
Rules 172, 174(d), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.172, 230.174(d) (2007) (treating access to the prospectus as delivery).
78. See I LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, § 2.B.3, at 423-24 ("The securities industry can hardly be
blamed for taking full advantage of this statutory scheme. But this is hardly the kind of informed investing that
was contemplated when the Securities Act was passed. A prospectus that comes with the security does not tell
the investor whether or not he or she should buy; it tells the investor whether he has acquired a security or a
lawsuit."); Richard E. Pringle, Summary Prospectus Proposal of Midwest Securities Commissioners
Association, 23 Bus. LAW. 567, 568 (1968) ("The purchaser ... does not usually receive the prospectus until
after he is committed to purchase the securities."). The Securities Act effectively required a section 10(a)
prospectus to be delivered after a sale. A prospectus meeting the requirements of section 10(a) must be provided
if and when a security is delivered after the sale. Securities Act § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (2000). A
confirmation of sale is itself a prospectus, Securities Act § 2(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2000), and when
the Securities Act was enacted securities transactions were generally subject to the statute of frauds. The statute
was typically satisfied by sending a written confirmation, and in order to do so in compliance with section
5(b)(l), confirmations were qualified as free writing by delivering them with or after a section 10(a) prospectus.
The 2005 reforms adopted the access equals delivery model for both these purposes as well, however. In most
cases, if a section 10(a) prospectus has been filed with the SEC it need not be delivered to a buyer. Rules 172,
174(d), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.172, 230.174(d) (2007).
79. A similar rationale explains other seemingly odd aspects of the statutory definition of prospectus as
well. Tombstones and identifying statements are permitted and exempt from section 12(a)(2) in order to allow
sellers to notify the public of the fact of the offering but not to inform them about the issuer of the offered
securities except by statutory prospectus. See supra text accompanying note 21 (discussing tombstones).
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The free writing-as-reward story also explains why false oral statements are covered
by section 12(a)(2).t ° It was reasonable to treat oral and written supplemental
communications differently in section 12(a)(2) because free writing is a better incentive
device than free talking would be.
The point of the Securities Act was to substitute a registration statement and
prospectus regime for the promotional excesses that were thought to have characterized
the 1920s. Toward this end, the Securities Act forbade all offers until a registration
statement became effective, on the theory that investors would educate themselves. The
red herring device, which administrators developed as investor self-education proved
impractical, permitted one form of written communication-the prospectus included in
the registration statement-to be used during the period between filing and effectiveness,
but left oral offers prohibited.8' In this context, a reluctance to countenance oral
communications as the price for getting statutory prospectuses distributed is quite
understandable.
Aside from the fact that oral communications were particularly suspect when the
Securities Act was adopted, conditioning the use of oral communications on the delivery
of section 10(a) prospectuses would not have been a very effective incentive anyway, and
certainly not as effective as free writing. The effectiveness of an incentive depends on the
targets' belief that they will get their reward only if they perform the task demanded of
them. Offering participants knew that they had to be able to prove that they had sent a
section 10(a) prospectus before they delivered any other written offering material. If they
could not, any recipient who kept the written material would be able to rescind a
subsequent purchase automatically on account of the violation of section 5(b)(1), and to
do so under section 12(a)(1),82 which does not even require a false statement or provide
any good faith defense. Accordingly, offering participants had to deliver a statutory
prospectus to get the free writing reward. On the other hand, market participants might
have been expected to conclude, as they apparently did in fact conclude, that they were
not likely to be held accountable for making unlawful telephone calls, inasmuch as it is
difficult to prove (or at least was difficult to prove in 1933) that a telephone call had been
made.83 They faced little risk of sanction if they made phone calls before sending a
statutory prospectus, and could have expected that sending a prospectus might well spoil
any subsequent sales pitch. Accordingly, a free talking regime would not have been an
effective mechanism for assuring the distribution of section 10(a) prospectuses.
Moreover, unlike statutory free writing, a free-talking exception-the right to make
oral statements free of section 12(a)(2) liability so long as the offering participant sent a
statutory prospectus first-would have been too expensive to be an effective incentive to
Confirmations are defined as prospectuses, and subject to being qualified as free writing, supra note 78, so that
sellers would be forced to eventually send a statutory prospectus by virtue of state statutes of frauds that
effectively required confirmations.
80. Gustafson assumed that written and oral communications should receive parallel treatment, and thus
stated without analysis that the "phrase 'oral communication' [in section 12(a)(2)] is restricted to oral
communications that relate to a prospectus." Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 567-68 (1995).
81. See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, § 2.B.2.b.I (discussing the so-called red herring prospectus).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1) (2000).
83. See I Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, § 2.B.2.c (discussing SEC's inability to enforce prohibition
of interstate telephone calls).
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send statutory prospectuses anyway. For most of the history of the Securities Act,
statutory prospectuses were elaborate printed documents prepared and distributed at
substantial expense. A free-talking regime would have required issuers and underwriters
to send those expensive documents blindly to prospective investors without knowing
whether they were at all interested in buying the subject security. The substantial wasted
expense of widespread distribution of unsolicited statutory prospectuses would have
undercut, and probably destroyed, the incentive effect of allowing free talking. It is
telling that when the SEC used its regulatory authority to require offering participants to
disseminate statutory prospectuses widely, it never required brokers and dealers to
distribute statutory prospectuses to all offerees, let alone before contacting them by
phone. 84
In contrast, excepting free writing from section 12(a)(2) created a particularly
efficient incentive mechanism that imposes few costs on either sellers or buyers. The
exception has great value for those who distribute section 10(a) prospectuses, and without
it the right to distribute free writing would not serve as much of an incentive, inasmuch as
their distribution of free writing would expose them to harsh liability if it turned out to
include false statements. Evidence that this risk would be chilling can be found in
contemporary hesitance to use free writing prospectuses, which are subject to section
12(a)(2) liability. 85 The risk of liability was even higher when the Securities Act was
adopted, since the statute did not allow defendants to escape liability by showing that any
decline in market value was unrelated to the misrepresentations in the communication at
issue. 86 Moreover, free writing is not likely to take the form of widely distributed,
standardized material that can be efficiently reviewed to assure that it is free of
inadvertent error. The value of free writing from the distributor's perspective is that it can
be personalized and used in many different forms. The same characteristics would make
the possibility of section 12(a)(2) liability particularly chilling, as it is difficult to justify
the expense of extensive due diligence with respect to casual and one-off
communications. The Supreme Court got little right in Gustafson, but surely there is
some merit to the argument that
[i]t is understandable that Congress would provide buyers with a right to
rescind, without proof of fraud or reliance, as to misstatements contained in a
document prepared with care, following well-established procedures relating to
investigations with due diligence .... It is not plausible to infer that Congress
created this extensive liability for every casual communication between buyer
and seller .... 87
While the right to use free writing is valuable, the cost that the statute imposes on
those availing themselves of the right is quite low. The seller can talk to his prospects to
gauge their interest before sending a statutory prospectus, so the cost of printing and
postage is easier to justify. The other cost-the risk of liability under section 12(a)(2) for,
84. See supra note 77 (detailing a shift in SEC policy from delivery to availability of statutory
prospectuses).
85. See infra text accompanying notes 182-184.
86. See supra text accompanying note 51 (explaining that the lack of loss causation affirmative defense
was added to section 12 in 1995).
87. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 578 (1995) (emphasis added).
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the section 10(a) prospectus they have to send-also turns out to be low. To be sure, the
risk of section 12(a)(2) liability is a heavy burden to people contemplating most written
communications that are subject to the section. However, a section 1 0(a) prospectus is the
one form of offer as to which section 12(a)(2) liability is not particularly burdensome.
The section 10(a) prospectus that serves as the base for free writing is included in the
effective registration statement, and as part of that registration statement it is subject to
liability under section 11. 88 If the section 10(a) prospectus contains a false statement of
material fact, the issuer, its directors, the underwriters and, in some cases, their experts
are liable for rescissory damages under section 11, even if the prospectus is never used.
Moreover, the defenses available in a section 11 action are even more limited than those
available under section 12(a)(2). 89 Section 12(a)(2) liability for a section 10(a)
prospectus, in other words, is seldom anything more than section 11 imposes anyway.90
Accordingly, sellers pay little to get the advantage of free writing.
Turning to the effect of the free writing exception on investors who receive false
free writing, it is important to remember that investors can recover under section 12(a)(2)
even if they have not been injured by the false statement at issue, 9' and that this was
especially so before the affirmative defense of noncausation was added. Thus, much of
the value of section 12(a)(2) lies in its power to assure that disclosures are accurate, even
at the price of overcompensating investors who receive false statements. 92 Inasmuch as
section 12(a)(2) serves purposes other than compensating investors, limiting its scope is
not particularly unfair, especially where limiting its scope actually leads to more accurate
disclosure overall (in the form of section 10(a) prospectuses). In any event, investors
have substantial protection from misleading free writing entirely apart from section
12(a)(2). Anyone injured by false free writing can still obtain compensation under state
securities law and through common law doctrines of fraud and rescission, as well as
under Rule lOb-5 93 if the seller acts with scienter (although the Rule lOb-5 remedy was
not available when the Securities Act was enacted). Moreover, the SEC can proceed
against those who use false free writing under section 17(a),94 which does not except free
88. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000); see supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing application of section
11 to section 10(a) prospectuses).
89. See Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at 44,770 (." Section II requires a more diligent
investigation than section 12(a)(2)."').
90. For some time, section 11 offered an affirmative defense of loss causation, but section 12(a)(2) did
not, and during that period a false section 10(a) prospectus might have exposed a seller to liability under section
12(a)(2) but not section 11 in some circumstances. As originally enacted, neither provision provided for the
defense. The affirmative defense contained in section 11(e) was added in 1934. Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 907 (1934). The affirmative defense contained in section 12(b) was added in
1995. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 105, 109 Stat. 737, 757 (1995).
Section 12(a)(2) also reaches some market participants who are not subject to section 11, particularly dealers in
the aftermarket immediately following a registered offering. However, dealers were long effectively required to
distribute statutory prospectuses anyway, see Securities Act of 1933 § 4(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3) (2000); cf Rule
174, 17 C.F.R. § 230.174 (2007) (prospectus delivery requirements for dealers), and dealers were not
particularly likely to use free writing other than confirmations even though it is exempt from section 12(a)(2).
91. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (explaining that a buyer need not show reliance on the false
statement).
92. See supra text accompanying note 47.
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2000).
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writing, and criminal sanctions are available for willful violations of section 17(a). 95
Perhaps most importantly, investors are unlikely to be harmed by false free writing
anyway. Before an investor is sent free writing, she has to be sent a section 10(a)
prospectus. While that prospectus need not disclose all material information, it does have
to disclose everything that the SEC requires, and the SEC requires most everything that
anybody thinks is material. If that statutory prospectus contains false statements of
material information, the investor has ample remedy under sections 11 and 12(a)(2).
Since investors will have that statutory prospectus to check against free writing, sellers
have little incentive to lie in free writing. In any event, investors can protect themselves
by using the section 10(a) prospectus to detect misleading free writing. Although there
are good reasons not to require buyers to exercise due diligence, it is not surprising that
courts have denied recovery for false statements when a statutory prospectus or other
formal document provided before the sale contained the truth, on the theory that any
reliance could not have been justified.96 There is also something to be said for
encouraging investors to read statutory prospectuses, and the SEC itself requires that free
writing prospectuses advise recipients that they should, as they say, "read before you
invest." 97 Moreover, investors who know that false free writing is not actionable under
section 12(a)(2) are less likely to rely upon it blindly (and, conversely, if false free
writing were actionable under section 1 2(a)(2), they would have every reason not to read
their section 10(a) prospectuses, inasmuch as recovery under section 12(a)(2) depends on
their ignorance of the truth). Finally, if the securities markets are even reasonably
efficient, accurate information in statutory prospectuses will swamp the effect of false
statements in free writing, so that even investors misled by free writing pay fair prices.
95. Securities Act of 1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2000).
96. See, e.g, Carr v. CIGNA Sec., Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 1996) (denying claim based on
plaintiff's receipt of documents warning of risky investments); Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121,
1131-32 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting cautionary language in prospectus); Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d
1020, 1030-33 (2d Cir. 1993) (same); Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1518 (10th Cir. 1983). These
cases were brought under Rule lOb-5 and do not involve challenges to free writing under section 12(a)(2), but
of course there are no section 12(a)(2) cases challenging false free writing. If free writing were actionable under
section 12(a)(2), these cases might be extended to section 12(a)(2) under the section's requirement that the
purchaser not know of the untruth, but see sources cited supra note 52 (discussing effect of correction under
section 12(a)(2)), or on the theory that prospectus disclosure renders any misrepresentation in free writing
nonmaterial in light of the total mix of available information. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
449 (1976) (requiring "a showing of substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact
would have assumed actual significance in the reasonable shareholder's deliberations"); In re Hyperion Sec.
Litig., [1995-96 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,906 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1995) (oral
misrepresentation at road show not actionable under section 12(a)(2) when statutory prospectus disclosed truth
and bespoke caution).
97. See Rule 433(c)(2)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(c)(2)(i) (2007) (requiring free writing prospectuses to
contain a legend stating that "[tihe issuer has filed a registration statement (including a prospectus) with the
SEC for the offering to which this communication relates. Before you invest, you should read the prospectus in
that registration statement"); Rule 163(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.163(b) (2007) (stating similar requirements for
prefiling communications by well-known seasoned issuers); Rule 482(b)(1)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.482(b)(1)(i)
(2007) (stating similar requirements for section 10(b) prospectuses of registered investment companies (e.g.,
mutual funds)).
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IV. FREE WRITING PROSPECTUSES AND SECTION 12(a)(2)
A. Free Writing Prospectuses are Not Exempt from Section 12(a)(2)
The main differences between free writing and free writing prospectuses are that the
latter: (1) may be used before a registration statement becomes effective; and (2) are
subject to section 12(a)(2). Indeed, the SEC made them free writing prospectuses to
achieve these results.98 In adopting its new rules, the SEC repeatedly emphasized that free
writing prospectuses are subject to liability under section 12(a)(2). 99 It also acted to
establish that a wide range of communications are in fact free writing prospectuses
subject to such liability. The Commission emphasized the breadth of the statutory
definition of offer,'00 which is the predicate for the definition of prospectus, and
expanded the definition of prospectus directly by effectively defining most electronic
offers to be written communications and thus prospectuses. 101
The Commission also adopted a new rule intended to ensure that issuers will be
liable under section 12(a)(2) for false free writing prospectuses they prepare that are
distributed by their underwriters. The section 1 2(a)(2) liability of issuers of underwritten
public offerings is problematic because the section provides that any person who offers or
sells a security by means of a prospectus or oral communication that includes an untrue
statement of material fact "shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from
him."'10 2 This language leaves some doubt about who is a good defendant in a section
12(a)(2) action. For example, in a firm commitment underwriting, the issuer sells to the
underwriters, who in turn sell to the public. If a prospectus prepared by the issuer and
delivered by the underwriter contains a false statement, a purchasing investor will have
purchased from the underwriter and not the issuer, and thus the issuer may not be liable
to the investor under section 1 2(a)(2).10 3
98. As a prospectus permitted under section 10(b), a free writing prospectus is not free writing. Securities
Act of 1933 § 2(a)(10)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(l0)(a) (2000). Conversely, free writing is explicitly excluded
from the definition of free writing prospectus. Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2006).
99. See, e.g., Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at 44,734 ("The rules we are adopting today ensure
that appropriate liability standards are maintained. For example, all free writing prospectuses have liability
under the same provisions [including section 12(a)(2)] as apply today to oral offers and statutory prospectuses
."). The Commission's adopting release cited section 12(a)(2) more than seventy times. Id.
100. Id. at 44,731 n.88.
101. See Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2006) (defining graphic communication and written
communication); see also Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at 44,732, 44,753-55 (explaining the
rationale for expanding the definition of prospectus). The SEC's Division of Corporate Finance has
subsequently reemphasized that many corporate communications that are ultimately reduced to graphic form,
whether printed or electronic, are free writing prospectuses if made while securities are being distributed.
Securities Offering Reform Questions and Answers Nov. 30, 2005,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/faqs/securities-offenngreformqa.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2000).
103. See Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotsky's Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[fln a firm
commitment underwriting, such as this one, the public cannot ordinarily hold the issuers liable under section 12,
because the public does not purchase from the issuers."); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1216 (1st
Cir. 1996) (holding that issuer and directors in a firm commitment underwriting generally cannot be held liable
under section 12[(a)](2)); 9 LOss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, § I 1.C.2, at 4239-40 ("Subject to exceptions
involving controlling persons, agents and aiders and abettors, it seems quite clear that § 12 contemplates only an
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New Rule 159A(a)' 4 imposes section 12(a)(2) liability on issuers in some
circumstances when an offering participant uses a misleading issuer-prepared free writing
prospectus, even if the security sold does not pass directly from the issuer to the plaintiff
purchaser.' 05 Rule 159A(a) provides that if securities are offered or sold to a person by
means of certain communications, including free writing prospectuses, prepared by or on
behalf of an issuer, then
[f]or purposes of section 12(a)(2) of the Act only, in a primary offering of
securities of the issuer, regardless of the underwriting method used to sell the
issuer's securities, seller shall include the issuer of the securities sold to a
person as part of the initial distribution of such securities, and the issuer shall
be considered to offer or sell the securities to such person ....
B. Free Writing About Free Writing Prospectuses
The thesis of this Article is that section 12(a)(2) liability should not attach to many
free writing prospectuses, and that, rather than undertaking to expand the scope of the
section, the SEC should have immunized those prospectuses from liability. Before
explaining why this is so, it is of course appropriate to establish that the SEC has
authority to provide this immunity. As discussed below, the Commission has ample
authority to do so. Remarkably, however, an examination of the authority upon which the
Commission relied in adopting its reform agenda also shows that the Commission was
not very careful in grounding its new rules in its Securities Act rulemaking authority.
1. Issuer Liability
The intent behind new Rule 159A(a) is tolerably clear: issuers that prepare false free
writing prospectuses that are used in firm commitment underwriting are liable under
section 12(a)(2) even when the plaintiff purchases from an underwriter. What is
remarkable is the way the Commission undertook to accomplish its goal. The
Commission has extensive rulemaking authority under the Securities Act, but it does not
have authority to create private causes of action. As the Rule's caption-"Definition of
seller for purposes of section 12(a)(2) of the Act,"--and language indicate,1 °7 in adopting
rule 159A(a) the Commission was relying upon its authority, under section 19(a) of the
Act, to make rules "defining accounting, technical and trade terms" used in the Securities
Act. 10 8 Rule 159A(a) defines the word "seller" in section 12(a)(2) to include the issuer in
certain cases, and presumably this makes the issuer liable in those cases. But the word
action by a buyer against his or her immediate seller. That is to say, in the case of the typical 'firm commitment
underwriting,' the ultimate investor can recover only from the dealer who sold to him or her.").
104. Rule 159A(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.159A(a) (2007).
105. See Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at 44,769 (explaining liability of the issuer as "seller").
106. Rule 159A(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.159A(a) (2007).
107. Id.
108. The Commission usually offers only vague explanations of its statutory authority to adopt rules, and it
did so in this case as well. See Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at 44,798 (stating generally that it
adopted the new rules "pursuant to" a variety of Securities Act, Securities Exchange Act, and Investment
Company Act provisions).
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"seller" does not appear in section 12. As the Commission often asks: Where were the
lawyers?
In treating the question as one of seller liability, the Commission was following a
convention in discussions of section 12, in which the issue of liability is typically phrased
in terms of whether the defendant is a seller. For example, in Pinter v. Dahl,10 9 in which
the question was liability under what is now section 12(a)(l), the Supreme Court wrote
about the defendant's status as a seller, often putting the word in quotation marks." 0 The
Court used those marks to indicate that for it "seller" was a placeholder for the set of
people from whom a buyer can recover under section 12. That is not what the
Commission is doing in rule 159A(a), however. The Commission is defining the word
"seller" in section 12, but that word is not there.
Rule 159A(a) also provides that "the issuer shall be considered to offer or sell the
securities to such person,"11 which does mirror the language of section 12(a)(2).1 12 Since
the rule does define some of the critical terms of the section, its definition of seller might
be dismissed as mere surplusage, albeit remarkably sloppy surplusage. This argument
might work if everyone who offers or sells a security were a good section 12(a)(2)
defendant, inasmuch as by defining the issuer to be making an offer or sale of a security,
the rule might have effectively extended liability to issuers. However, section 12(a)(2)
does not make anyone who offers or sells by means of a false statement liable to the
ultimate purchaser. Instead, it only makes such a person, in the words of the statute,
"liable... to the person purchasing such security from him."'1 3 The quoted words-
unreferenced in the rule-limit the field of proper defendants. 114 Indeed, these very words
are the ones that create doubt about the liability of an issuer in a firm commitment
underwriting. 
115
109. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988). The Court reserved the question of whether its analysis would
govern a case under section 12(a)(2). Id. at 642 n.20.
110. Id. at 625.
111. 17 C.F.R. § 230.159A(a) (2007).
112. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2000) (referring to any person who "offers or sells a security").
113. Id.
114. See Pinter, 486 U.S. at 643 ("Determining that the activity in question falls within the definition of
'offer' or 'sell' in § 2(3), however, is only half of the analysis. The second clause of § 12(1), which provides
that only a defendant 'from' whom the plaintiff 'purchased' securities may be liable, narrows the field of
potential sellers.").
115. Id. at 244 n.21 ("One important consequence of this provision is that § 12(1) imposes liability on only
the buyer's immediate seller; remote purchasers are precluded from bringing actions against remote sellers.
Thus, a buyer cannot recover against his seller's seller.") (citing LOUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1023-24 (2d ed. 1988); Douglas & Bates, supra note 47, at 171);
Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotsky's Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he pivot point here is not
whether defendants were 'sellers', because 'Congress expressly intended to define broadly' the concept of seller
to 'encompass the entire selling process, including the seller/agent transaction.' Rather, our issue is controlled
by section 12's provision that a seller is only liable 'to the person purchasing such security from him.' The
argument is that in a firm commitment underwriting, the public purchases from the underwriter, not from the
issuer.").
An examination of the extent of the SEC's authority to define terms used in the Securities Act is
beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, one wonders whether the Commission does have the authority to
define the terms of section 12(a)(2) in a way that extends liability to issuers for documents used by
underwriters. An effective definitional rule would have to define not simply terms but whole clauses of the
statute, and would amount to whole-cloth redrafting, not statutory administration or interpretation.
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2. Section 10(b)
Even if Rule 159A(a) is flawed, it is only a peripheral part of the 2005 reforms.116
The rules allowing the use of free writing prospectuses, in contrast, are at the heart of the
reforms, and the Commission's assumption of regulatory authority with respect to them is
even more problematic. This Article focuses on the application of section 12(a)(2) to free
writing prospectuses that contain false statements. However, careful analysis of the
grounds on which the SEC placed its new rules suggests that those who use free writing
prospectuses, even entirely accurate ones, may be exposed to liability under section
12(a)(1), which entitles a security buyer to rescind her purchase if a security is offered or
sold to her in violation of section 5(b)(1) of the Securities Act.
Section 5(b)(1) makes it unlawful to transmit a prospectus in interstate commerce
after a registration statement has been filed, "unless such prospectus meets the
requirements of section 10. " 117 If the reform rules work, it is because free writing
prospectuses meet the requirements of section 10(b), and they are supposed to. In the
language of the SEC's rules, a free writing prospectus is "a section 10(b) prospectus for
purposes of section 5(b)(1) of the [Securities] Act," 118 and "a prospectus permitted under
section 10(b) of the Act for purposes of section[] ... 5(b)(1)." ' 19 The language the
Commission used in the rules does not match that of section 5(b)(1), which demands a
prospectus that meets the requirements of section 10. This mismatch obscures the
substantial possibility that free writing prospectuses will not meet the requirements of
section 10, so that their use will in fact violate section 5(b)(1).
Section 10(b) is expressed in terms of permissible prospectuses, but, as the language
of section 5(b)(1) reflects, it has requirements, and free writing prospectuses do not seem
to meet them. Section 10(b) authorizes (in fact directs) the SEC to adopt rules that permit
the use of a prospectus for purposes of section 5(b)(1) that "omits in part or summarizes
information in the prospectus specified in subsection [10](a)."' 120 Thus by its terms
section 10(b) authorizes the SEC to permit prospectuses that omit or summarize some or
all of the information in a section 10(a) prospectus, but not prospectuses that contain
information that is not contained in a section 10(a) prospectus. Section 10(b) does not
authorize the SEC to permit whatever prospectus it wants, but only allows it to whittle
away from the registration-statement based prospectus of section 10(a).
Free writing prospectuses do much more than summarize or omit parts of a section
10(a) prospectus. The SEC's rules contemplate prospectuses that entirely omit the
information in the section 10(a) prospectus and, more importantly in this connection, that
contain information that is not contained in the registration statement at all. Indeed, so far
the most commonly used free writing prospectuses are term sheets that contain nothing
but information that is not in the section 10(a) prospectus. 11 In any event, the rules
116. Indeed, it has something of an add-on quality, as though the Commission said while we are permitting
some new forms of communication, we will expand the scope of liability for all communications.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
118. Rule 164(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.164(a) (2007).
119. Rule 433(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(a) (2007).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (2000).
121. See Anna T. Pinedo & James R. Tanenbaum, Afraid of Revolution-Liability Concerns Have
Impoverished the Use of Free-Writing Prospectuses Under U.S. Offering Reforms, INT'L FIN. L. REV., at 24,
Oct. 2007 (noting that most prospectuses "are being sued principally for term sheets"); Joseph McLaughlin,
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governing free writing prospectuses make no reference to the contents of a section 10(a)
prospectus, do not require that free writing prospectuses summarize or contain anything
in a section 10(a) prospectus, and expressly permit free writing prospectuses to include
information that is not contained in the section 10(a) prospectus.12 2 The contents of the
section 10(a) prospectus control the content of a free writing prospectus only to the extent
that a free writing prospectus may not contradict the registration statement. 1
23
Until it adopted the free writing prospectus rules, the SEC itself apparently
understood-and repeatedly stated-that section 10(b) does not authorize it to permit
prospectuses that contain information not contained in section 10(a) prospectuses. It had
never used its section 10(b) authority to permit a prospectus that did anything other than
abridge a section 10(a) prospectus, and accordingly the prospectuses the SEC permitted
under section 10(b) were commonly and accurately referred to as summary,1
24
omitting, 125  abbreviated, 12 6 and preliminary 12  prospectuses. Moreover, with one
exception discussed below, in which it did not rely upon section 10(b), the SEC had
never permitted a prospectus to include information not contained in a filed registration
statement, beyond incidental state-required legends and information that was otherwise
permitted in identifying statements under section 2(a)(10)(b) and its implementing rules.
The first short-form "prospectuses" permitted under the Securities Act were the so-
called red herrings that the FTC and SEC permitted soon after the enactment of the
Act. 128 They reproduced the contents of the filed registration statement, and the
Commission did not permit supplementary selling literature or recommendations.1
2 9
When the SEC codified the red herring practice in a rule, it permitted the distribution of a
form of prospectus that was contained in the registration statement, which had to include
substantially all the information required by the Securities Act except for information
respecting the offering price. 130 Thus red herrings could not include any information that
Securities Offerings, Late-Breaking Information and the SEC's Rule 159, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1080
(June 19, 2006) ("[T]he vast majority of the free-writing prospectuses filed... have been term sheets."); Rachel
McTague, Issuers' Offering Practices Changing Under New Rules, Securities Lawyer Says, 38 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 161 (Jan. 30, 2006) (discussing one expert's reaction to the large number of term sheets by those
filing prospectuses).
122. See Rule 433(a), (c)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(a), (c)(l), (2007) (free writing prospectuses "may include
information the substance of which is not included in the registration statement").
123. Rule 433(c)(1)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(c)(1)(i) (2007).
124. See Rule 431, 17 C.F.R. § 230.431 (2006) (entitled "Summary Prospectuses").
125. See H.R. REP. No. 104-622 (1996) ("the 'omitting' prospectus that is permitted pursuant to rules
promulgated by the Commission under section 10(b) of the Securities Act"), at 45; Off-the-Page Prospectus for
Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 6982, 53 SEC Docket 1902 (Mar.
19, 1993) (referring to Rule 482 summary prospectus as "omitting prospectus"); PROTECTING INVESTORS, supra
note 70, at 359 (discussing "[T]he so-called 'omitting prospectus' rule").
126. See I Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, § 2.B.5, at 477 (mentioning summary prospectuses).
127. See Rule 430, 17 C.F.R. § 230.430 (2007) (universally referred to as preliminary prospectus); see also
supra note 26 (discussing whether preliminary prospectuses meet the requirements of section 10(a) or 10(b)).
128. See generally 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, § 2.B.2 (entitled "Section 5 Before the 1954
Amendments: A Magna Carta for Investors or Another Prohibition Law?").
129. See Text of Letter of Federal Trade Commission Relating to Offers of Sale Prior to the Effective Date
of the Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 70, 1933 WL 28707 (Nov. 6, 1933) (discussing
whether underwriters could distribute supplemental selling literature prior to registration), reprinted in 11 Fed
Reg. 10,948 (Sept. 27, 1946); 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, § 2.B.2, at 403.
130. Securities Act Release No. 3177, 1946 SEC LEXIS 156 (Dec. 5, 1946) (adopting Rule 131 for six
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was not in the registration statement.
Red herrings were used before section 10(b) was enacted in 1954, so they are not
direct evidence of the understanding of the section. However, section 10(b) was intended
simply to codify the Commission's permitted practice, not to change it, and so that
practice is important evidence of what Congress was doing when it enacted section
10(b). "' Neither the text of section 10(b) nor its legislative history gives any suggestion
that the SEC was authorized to permit prospectuses that contained information not
included in the filed section 10(a) prospectus.
Section 10's expressed requirement that a prospectus be based on a registration
statement impressed the Supreme Court in Gustafson, and its construction of section 10
in that case might be understood to preclude the Commission's new approach to section
10(b). The Court did not cite section 10(b) in Gustafson and in any event its analysis is so
slipshod that it cannot fairly be cited to show the reasonableness of any construction of
the Securities Act. Nonetheless, Gustafson's very incoherence makes it difficult to
distinguish, and the Court's pronouncements are most definitive when grounded in fiat.' 
32
The Court recognized that section 10 prospectuses are based on the information contained
in registration statements, and said that they must be: "Section 10 does not provide that
some prospectuses must contain the information contained in the registration
statement .... [I]ts mandate is unqualified: '[A] prospectus ... shall contain the
information contained in the registration statement."1
33
The SEC's decision to rely upon section 10(b) to permit free writing prospectuses
that include information not contained in the registration statement is as inconsistent with
the Commission's own past practice as it is with the statutory language and history. Prior
to the 2005 reforms, the SEC had never relied upon section 10(b) to permit prospectuses
that included information not contained in a registration statement.
When the 1954 amendments became effective, the Commission replaced its red
herring rule with what is now Rule 430, which permits the use during the waiting period
of a preliminary prospectus filed as part of the registration statement and including all the
information required of a section 10(a) prospectus except the price of the security and
information dependent thereon. 34 Shortly thereafter the SEC adopted a rule that declared
that cards prepared by independent organizations that fairly summarized information in
the preliminary prospectus contained in the filed registration statement met the
months and containing text of the rule); Securities Act Release No. 3240, 1947 SEC LEXIS 103 (July 10, 1947)
(adopting the rule permanently).
131. See H.R REP. No 83-1542 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2973, 2980 ("From the earliest
days of the Commission's administration of the Securities Act, preeffective summaries of information as filed
have been permitted."); id at 2983 ("The amendment conforms the statute to the present practice."); S. REP.
No. 83-1036, at 2 (1954) ("[t]he bill ... makes limited changes, largely technical in nature."); 1 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 13, § 2.B.2, at 414; ef Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 645 (1988) (stating that the 1954
amendments to section 12(a)(1) were intended to preserve existing law); I LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, §
2.B.6, at 505-06 (similar).
132. Cf Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (choosing the president).
133. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a) (2000)); see also id.
("[W]hatever else prospectus may mean, the term is confined to a document that, absent an overriding
exemption, must include the information contained in the registration statement.").
134. Rule 430, 17 C.F.R. § 230.430 (2007).
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requirements of section 10 during the waiting period. 135 Like the preliminary prospectus
and red herring rules, the card rule did not contemplate prospectuses that would contain
any information not contained in the registration statement, and by explicitly providing
that the card could identify the person distributing it and carry any legends required by
state law, the rule indicated that the card could not include any other information.
In 1956, the SEC adopted Rule 434A, which permitted the use of summary
prospectuses. 136 The purpose of a summary prospectus, according to the Commission,
was to give prospective investors a condensed or summarized statement of the
information in the registration statement.' 37 A summary prospectus was required to
include certain information contained in the registration statement and could include
other such information. It could not, however, "include any information the substance of
which [was] not contained in the registration statement except that a summary prospectus
[could] contain any information specified in Rule 134(a) [i.e., the identifying statement
rule].' 38
In 1982, the SEC rescinded its card rule and amended Rule 434A and renumbered it
Rule 431.'9 Rule 431, still in effect, continues the ban on including in a section 10(b)
summary prospectus "any information the substance of which is not contained in the
registration statement except that a summary prospectus may contain any information
specified in Rule 134(a) [i.e., the identifying statement rule]."' 140 The Commission never
publicly explained why it included this limitation in the summary prospectus rule,
arguably its central section 10(b) rule until it adopted the 2005 reforms, 14' but the history
of its subsequent insistence that prospectuses contain only information the substance of
which is contained in a registration statement indicates that both the Commission and,
more importantly, Congress, viewed this to be a requirement of section 10(b).
The clearest evidence that a prospectus that meets the requirements of section 10(b)
cannot contain information that is not in a registration statement lies in the manner in
which the SEC has regulated mutual fund advertising. Mutual funds have special
problems with section 5(b)(1) because they are constantly offering their securities to the
public, so that any written communication directed to the public risks running afoul of
section 5(b)(1). In recognition of this, the Commission has, over time, given them special
freedom to use section 10(b) prospectuses for advertising. In fact, prior to the adoption of
135. See Adoption of Rule 434, Securities Act Release No. 3592, 1955 SEC LEXIS 77 (Nov. 10, 1955)
(repealed 1982).
136. Adoption of Summary Prospectus Rule and Amendments to Form S-1 and S-9, Securities Act Release
No. 3722, 1956 SEC LEXIS 139 (Nov. 26, 1956) (amended and redesignated as Rule 431 in 1982).
137. Id.
138. Id. at *5.
139. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, Exchange Act Release
No. 18,524, Investment Company Act Release No. 12,264, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,440 (Mar. 16, 1982)
[hereinafter Integrated Disclosure].
140. Rule 431(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.431(b) (2007).
141. Rule 430 preliminary prospectuses are used much more often than Rule 431 summary prospectuses,
but it is not clear that they are in fact section 10(b) prospectuses. See supra note 26 and accompanying text
(discussing confusion over whether a preliminary prospectus meets the requirements of section 10(a) or section
10(b)). In any event, they are even more closely tied to the contents of the registration statement, inasmuch as
they must be filed as part of the registration statement. See Rule 430(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.430(a) (2006) ("Every
such form of prospectus shall be deemed to have been filed as part of the registration statement for the purpose
of section 7 of the Act.").
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the free writing prospectus rules, mutual funds alone were allowed to include in summary
prospectuses information that was not contained in a section 10(a) prospectus or a
registration statement at all. This exceptional treatment does not indicate that section
10(b) authorizes the SEC to permit a prospectus that includes information that is not
contained in a section 10(a) prospectus. On the contrary, the history of this special
treatment shows that the Commission does not have that authority.
The SEC first addressed the use of section 10(b) prospectuses by registered
investment companies in 1972, when it amended its then-effective summary prospectus
rule to make it available to such companies.1 42 That rule, then as now, forbade the
inclusion of information the substance of which was not contained in the registration
statement. Later the SEC proposed to give mutual funds greater latitude in the use of
summary prospectuses, but insisted that the proposed investment company summary
prospectuses would, like other summary prospectuses, be limited to information the
substance of which was contained in a section 10(a) prospectus. The Commission's
explanation of this limitation is telling, for it admits of the limits of the SEC's section
10(b) power:
Advertisements made pursuant to the proposed rule would be limited to
information the substance of which is contained in a section 10(a) prospectus.
This is proposed because section 10(b) permits the Commission only to
authorize the use of a prospectus for the purpose of subsection (b)(1) of section
5 which omits in part or summarizes information in the prospectus specified in
section 1 0(a). Therefore, any information in an advertisement permitted under
section 10(b) must be limited to information which is in the prospectus
specified in section 1 0(a).143
Notwithstanding substantial criticism, the Commission ultimately adopted the
limitation. Rule 434d, subsequently amended and redesignated Rule 482,144 provided that
a mutual fund advertising prospectus under section 10(b) could contain "only information
the substance of which is included in the section 10(a) prospectus.' 145 Once again, the
Commission's explanation of the limitation was that under section 10(b) it could permit
only a prospectus that contains information included in a section 10(a) prospectus: "[A]
rule promulgated under Section 10(b) of the 1933 Act must contain this limitation....
because Section 10(b) provides authority only for a prospectus which 'omits in part' or
'summarizes' information in the Section 10(a) prospectus."' 146
142. Adoption of Rule Changes Relating to Investment Company Act, Securities Act Release No. 5248,
1972 SEC LEXIS 70 (May 9, 1972).
143. Advertising by Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 5833, Investment Company Act
Release No. 9811, 12 SEC Docket 753 (June 8, 1977) (proposing release) (emphasis added).
144. Rule 482, 17 C.F.R. § 230.482 (2007); see Integrated Disclosure, supra note 139 (discussing various
revisions to the rules and regulations).
145. Rule 434d(a)(2) (since amended and redesignated Rule 482, 17 C.F.R. § 230.482 (2007)); Advertising
by Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 6116, Investment Company Act Release No. 10,852, 44
Fed. Reg. 52,816 (Sept. 10, 1979) (adopting Rule 434d).
146. Advertising by Investment Companies, supra note 145, at 52,816-17 (Sept. 10, 1979). When the
Commission proposed to amend Rule 482 to allow mutual funds to use so-called off-the-page prospectuses-
advertisements including order forms-it again indicated that in order to satisfy section 10(b), the substance of
the information contained in an off-the-page prospectus would have to be included in the section 10(a)
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The "substance of which" limitation, which was then included in every rule
authorizing section 10(b) prospectuses, was particularly burdensome for mutual funds,
inasmuch as they could advertise only performance information that was contained in
their registration statements, and had to take steps to assure that changed performance
information was so contained before they could publish it. The limitation effectively
prevented some mutual fund advertising and also led to registration statement bloat,
inasmuch as anything included in an advertisement had to be included in the registration
statement. 147
In 1992, the SEC's Division of Investment Management recommended that the
Investment Company Act be amended to allow the SEC to make available to mutual
funds a prospectus that would not be limited to information "the substance of which" is
contained in a section 10(a) prospectus. 148 It explained that legislation was necessary
because section 10(b) dictated its existing rule's requirement that mutual fund
advertisements include only information "the substance of which" is included in the
section 10(a) prospectus:
Rule 482 permits investment companies to advertise any information "the
substance of which" is included in the statutory prospectus. The "substance of'
requirement relates directly to the word "omits" in section 10(b) of the
Securities Act, upon which authority for the rule rests. The theory behind the
"substance of' requirement is that an advertisement cannot be one that "omits"
information from the statutory prospectus unless all of the information in the
advertisement is derived from (i.e., is the "substance of") information in the
statutory prospectus. 1
49
In 1996, Congress concluded that the regulatory scheme of the Securities Act was
inappropriate for mutual fund advertising and moved to liberalize it by enacting the
SEC's recommendation. 50 Congress recognized that the contents of section 10(b)
prospectuses must be limited to information in a section 10(a) prospectus, but found this
restriction unduly burdensome for mutual funds. 15 1 Accordingly, Congress amended the
prospectus. Off-the-Page Prospectus for Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release
No. 6982, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,342, 58 Fed. Reg. 16,141, 16,146 (Mar. 25, 1993).
147. See S. REP. No. 104-293, at 8 (1996).
Currently, funds may advertise performance data and other information, so long as the 'substance
of' that information is contained in the funds prospectus. As a result, funds often clutter up their
prospectuses with information they may later want to include in advertisements. For example,
funds could not advertise matters of investor interest, including whether it will hold derivatives or
the effect of economic conditions on the funds investment policies, without having included this
information in the funds prospectus.
Id.
148. PROTECTING INVESTORS, supra note 70, at 361-68.
149. Id. at360.
150. See S. REP. No. 104-293 (1996); H. R. REP. NO. 104-622 (1996).
151. See S. REP. No. 104-293, at 8 (1996) ("The bill improves fund advertising by giving the Commission
express authority to create a new investment company 'advertising prospectus.' Funds would be able to use an
advertising prospectus to show performance data and other information unrestricted by the 'substance of
requirement."); H. R. REP. No. 104-622, at 45 (1996).
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Investment Company Act to direct the SEC to permit an additional form of Securities Act
prospectus for registered investment companies, and provided that "[s]uch a prospectus,
which may include information the substance of which is not included in the prospectus
specified in section 10(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, shall be deemed to be permitted
by section 10(b) of that Act."'52
When the SEC proposed to amend its mutual fund advertising rule to reflect the new
legislation, it once again indicated that, except pursuant to the power created by the 1996
amendment to the Investment Company Act, it did not have authority to permit a
prospectus that contained information not included in a section 10(a) prospectus. 153 In
2003, the Commission changed its rule for mutual fund summary prospectuses to provide
expressly that they "may include information the substance of which is not included in
the prospectus specified in section 10(a)."' 154 Yet again, it explained that section 10(b)
permits only prospectuses whose contents are included in section 10(a) prospectuses:
"[A]dvertisements are 'prospectuses' under section 10(b) of the Securities Act (so-called
'omitting prospectuses'), which means that, historically [i.e., until the 1996 amendment
of the Investment Company Act], they could only contain information the 'substance of
which' is included in the statutory prospectus."'
155
The Commission did not permit issuers that were not registered investment
companies to use a section 10(b) prospectus that included information the substance of
which was not included in a section 10(a) prospectus, of course. Presumably this was
because Congress had amended only the Investment Company Act, not section 10(b), and
the new power it created went only to prospectuses used by registered investment
companies. Nonetheless, just two years later-and quite remarkably given the history of
Unlike the 'omitting' prospectus that is permitted pursuant to rules promulgated by the
Commission under section 10(b) of the Securities Act, the advertising prospectus authorized by
new section 24(g) (of the Investment Company Act] is not restricted to information 'the substance
of which' is included in the funds statutory prospectus (the prospectus mandated by Section 10(a)
of the Securities Act).
H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 45.
152. Investment Company Act § 24(g), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(g) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-290, §
204, 110 Stat. 3416, 3428 (1996).
153. See Proposed Amendment to Investment Company Advertising Rules, Securities Act Release No.
8101, Exchange Act Release No. 45,953, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,575, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,712,
36,712-13 (May 24, 2002).
Rule 482 advertisements are 'prospectuses' under section 10(b) of the Securities Act (so-called
'omitting prospectuses'), which means that, historically, they could only contain information the
'substance of which' is included in the statutory prospectus. In . . .1996 . . . , Congress amended
the Investment Company Act to permit, subject to rules adopted by the Commission, the use of
prospectuses under section 10(b) of the Securities Act that include information the substance of
which is not included in the statutory prospectus.
Id.; see also id. at 36,713-14, 36,716-17 (discussing Rule 482).
154. Rule 482(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.482(a) (2007); Amendments to Investment Company Advertising Rules,
Securities Act Release No. 8294, Exchange Act Release No. 48,558, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,195, 68 Fed. Reg. 57,760, 57,760 (Oct. 6, 2003); see also Rule 498, 17 C.F.R. § 230.498(b) (2007) (stating
requirements for fund profiles).
155. Amendments to Investment Company Advertising Rules, supra note 154, at 57,760 (footnotes
omitted).
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the language-the SEC parroted the 1996 amendment of the Investment Company Act
and its own revised mutual fund rule by providing that a free writing prospectus "may
include information the substance of which is not included in the registration
statement."'
56
In sum, the SEC has never before used its section 10(b) authority to permit a
prospectus that contains substantive information that is not included in a section 10(a)
prospectus filed as part of a registration statement. The Commission has also repeatedly,
until now, insisted that it does not have the power to do so. When Congress wanted to
permit mutual funds to include extra information in their advertising prospectuses, it did
not change section 10(b) or say that the SEC was wrong, but instead amended the
Investment Company Act to authorize the SEC to allow registered investment companies,
but only registered investment companies, to use prospectuses that include information
not included in the section 10(a) prospectus. Thus, when the SEC adopted the free writing
rules, all authorities indicated that section 10(b) did not empower the Commission to
permit prospectuses that include information that is not included in a section 10(a)
prospectus filed as part of a registration statement. The Commission did not mention this
authority at all in 2005. If it is binding, free writing prospectuses do not meet the
requirements of section 10(b), and thus their use violates section 5(b)(1).
The analysis above is no doubt technical, and it is the common practice of even
cautious lawyers to use prospectuses that do not exactly match the contents of filed
registration statements, at least in minor respects (although, interestingly, section 10's
requirement that a prospectus "contain" the information in a registration statement has
generally been understood to require that the registration statement be amended if the
prospectus includes information that differs from-as opposed to supplements-that in
the registration statement). 57 Moreover, the SEC might alternatively have permitted pre-
effective date dissemination of written offering material containing information not
contained in a section 10(a) prospectus by defining such material not to be a
prospectus. 158 Nonetheless, even if these details are technical, they are the details of the
central statutory structure of the Securities Act. That structure is simple and clear, and
anyone who has spent any time with the Act knows it. Until a registration statement is
effective, written offering material is limited to tombstones, identifying statements, and
prospectuses derived from the filed registration statement. After effectiveness, and only
after effectiveness, free writing is permitted. The Commission may have correctly
156. See also Proposing Release, supra note 41, at 67,416 n.190 ("The treatment of a free writing
prospectus as a permitted prospectus under Securities Act Section 10(b) would be the same as sales literature
used by investment companies and business development companies under Securities Act Rule 482.").
157. See I Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, § 2.C.3(a) (discussing the amendment process); see also Rule
424(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.424(b) (2007) (discussing prospectus filing procedure); Elimination of Certain Pricing
Agreements and Revision of Prospectus Filing Procedures, Securities Act Release No. 6714, Investment
Company Act Release No. 15,752, 38 SEC Docket 506, 514-15 (May 27, 1987) (discussing situations in which
revised prospectus must be refiled).
158. The Commission might have permitted such communications by declanng them to be identifying
statements under section 2(a)(10)(b) (authority to specify tombstone and identifying statement contents), or by
using its section 19(a) power to define the term "prospectus" to exclude them. However, even assuming those
provisions give the Commission sufficient authority to permit free writing during the waiting period, relying
upon them to do so would have had other consequences, not the least of which would have been exempting free
writing prospectuses from section 12(a)(2).
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concluded that free writing should be allowed before effectiveness, but that is not the
statute Congress wrote, and it is not for the SEC to repeal it. The Commission is not
authorized to declare by rule that all written offering materials meet the requirements of
section 10. That is not administering the Securities Act, it is changing it.
In the end, however, anyone acting in good faith conformity with an SEC rule is free
of statutory liability even if that rule is subsequently found invalid.' 59 Accordingly, the
argument set forth above is unlikely ever to be presented to a court. The SEC cannot be
expected to make it, and investors have little reason to claim that free writing
prospectuses do not meet the requirements of section 10(b), so that their use violates
section 5(b)(1), if they will not get anything under section 12(a)(1) even if they are
successful.
Moreover, instead of insisting that a free writing prospectus meets the requirements
of section 10(b) (or, as Rule 164(a) puts it, is "a section 10(b) prospectus"160 ), the
Commission could have simply exempted free writing prospectuses from section 5(b)(l).
Section 28 of the Securities Act provides that the SEC may "conditionally or
unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction ... from any provision or
provisions of' the Act. 16 ' The Commission clearly has authority under section 28 to
exempt free writing prospectuses from sections 5 and 12(a)(2). Nonetheless, it chose to
forgo exemption and instead to assert that free writing prospectuses satisfy section
10(b). 162 If it wanted to permit free writing prospectuses to be used only if subject to
section 12(a)(2), the Commission could have simply exempted free writing prospectuses
from section 5(b)(l) but left them subject to section 12(a)(2). Perhaps the SEC's staff
chose not to follow this approach because adopting a partial exemption from section 5 but
not section 12 would have brought to the forefront the question of why the Commission
was not also exempting free writing prospectuses from section 12(a)(2). 163 A careful
examination of that question is in order. The considerations that justify permitting the use
of free writing prospectuses notwithstanding section 5(b)(l) also suggest that such
prospectuses should not be subject to section 12(a)(2) either if they are not broadly
disseminated before a final section 10(a) is available.
159. See § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2000) (stating that "[n]o provision of this subchapter imposing any
liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith ... notwithstanding that such rule or regulation may
... be amended or rescinded").
160. 17 C.F.R. § 230.164(a) (2007).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (2000).
162. Rule 163, 17 C.F.R. § 230.163 (2007), which permits well-known seasoned issuers to use free writing
prospectuses before filing a registration statement, relies upon section 28 and declares the use of such
prospectuses to be "exempt from the prohibitions in section 5(c)." Rule 163, 17 C.F.R. § 230.163(a) (2007). The
SEC also extended the benefit of Rule 482, the mutual fund advertising rule, to business development
companies under its section 28 exemptive authority. See Proposed Amendment to Investment Company
Advertising Rules, supra note 153, at 36,716.
163. When it proposed the reforms, the SEC explained that treating free writing prospectuses as section
10(b) prospectuses would allow for greater SEC oversight. See Proposing Release, supra note 41, at 67,416
(remarking that such treatment "would provide for additional continuing Commission oversight"). I have in the
past criticized the courts for failing to recognize the SEC's broad rulemaking power. Steve Thel, $850,000 in 6
Minutes-The Mechanics of Securities Manipulation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 219, 219 (1994); Steve Thel, The
Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 394 (1990). At the
same time, I think it is incumbent on the Commission to recognize and operate within the limits of its authority.
20081
The Journal of Corporation Law
C. Free Writing Prospectuses Should Be Exempt from Section 12(a)(2) If They Are Not
Broadly Disseminated Before a Final Section 10(a) Prospectus Is Available
Even if the SEC could have done a better job if it wanted to assure that false free
writing prospectuses would be actionable under section 12(a)(2), the more important
question is whether free writing prospectuses should be subject to such actions at all.
The SEC's 2005 reforms were generally welcomed by Wall Street. The new rules
substantially trimmed section 5 restrictions on written communications, and, except for
the expansion of issuer liability under section 12(a)(2), the Commission did not create
any new burdens that market participants cannot avoid by the simple expedient of leaving
the new tools unused.164 Moreover, the new rules provide a clear framework pursuant to
which written and electronic communications can now be broadly disseminated without
violating section 5(b)(1). Accordingly, the general effect of the reforms is simply to give
those distributing securities new flexibility, albeit flexibility accompanied by section
12(a)(2) liability, that they can choose to use or not.
Changes in the public offering process since 1933 would make it inappropriate to
exempt all free writing prospectuses from section 12(a)(2). Securities may not be sold in
a public offering until the registration statement becomes effective, and for a long time
registration statements did not become effective until a complete section 10(a) prospectus
had been filed with the Commission. Thus when the Securities Act was adopted, a
complete section 10(a) prospectus was available before anyone purchased securities in a
public offering. Even before the 2005 reforms were adopted, however, registration
statements could become effective without a variety of information relating to the price
of the securities being offered, including the total proceeds to the issuer.' 65 Moreover,
with the abolition of the statute of frauds for securities transactions, investors can enter
binding contracts to purchase securities before receiving any written document. 166 While
dealers must distribute preliminary prospectuses before confirming sales in initial public
164. This statement must be qualified by the possibility, discussed infra Part V, that Gustafson stands for
the proposition that only standardized offering documents of broad distribution are subject to section 12(a)(2).
The SEC contemplated that some free writing prospectuses will not be broadly distributed documents, and thus
dispensed with filing requirements for free writing prospectuses distributed by non-issuers in a manner not
reasonably designed to lead to broad unrestricted distribution. Rule 433(d)(1)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(d)(1)(ii)
(2007). The rules seem designed to preclude any argument that a free writing prospectus that is not widely
disseminated is exempt from liability under Gustafson. See Rule 433(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(a) (2007) ("[A]
free writing prospectus ... will, for purposes of considering it a prospectus, be deemed to be public, without
regard to its method of use or distribution, because it is related to the public offering of securities that are the
subject of a filed registration statement.").
165. See Rule 430A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.430A (2007) (listing the information that a prospectus filed as part of
a registration statement that is declared effective may omit); see also Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1,
at 44,765-66 (explaining that "Section 12(a)(2) and Section 17(a)(2) do not require that ... the prospectus ...
contain all material information").
166. U.C.C. § 8-319 (2005). When the Securities Act was enacted, securities transactions were generally
subject to the statute of frauds, so that a buyer was not bound until she had received a confirmation of the trade.
A confirmation is itself a prospectus within the meaning of the Securities Act, so the only way a dealer could
send a confirmation was to accompany or precede it with a section 10(a) prospectus, thereby converting the
confirmation to free writing. Thus investors received a section 10(a) prospectus at some point, although often
after they had made their investment decisions.
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offerings, 167 many publicly offered securities are sold before a complete section 10(a)
prospectus is even available, let alone delivered.
Thus public offerings are often completed without the backdrop of an effective
registration statement with a complete section 10(a) prospectus subject to section 11, and
inaccurate preliminary prospectuses and broadly disseminated free writing prospectuses
may mislead investors and the market as a whole. If an investor is provided a preliminary
prospectus or other non-free writing document that contains a false statement of material
fact, she can rescind her contract under section 12(a)(2), even if the registration statement
declared effective contains correct information, so that section 11 is not available. The
2005 reforms clearly establish the availability of section 12(a)(2) in this situation, and
provide that the critical point for purposes of section 12(a)(2) is the time a contract of sale
is entered, and that, in evaluating the accuracy of a prospectus or oral communication,
information provided after the sale will not be taken into account.' 68 In recognition of the
fact that offering documents may give rise to section 12(a)(2) liability, underwriting
agreements for public offerings generally require the issuer to warrant the accuracy of the
so-called disclosure package, made up of the preliminary prospectus and other
enumerated documents, typically including any permitted free writing prospectus.
Even in this situation, any false statement would likely be in the preliminary
prospectus and not in a free writing prospectus, but the application of section 12(a)(2) to
a misleading free writing prospectus could be justified as providing investors with the
protection that section 11 might have been thought to provide when the Securities Act
was adopted.169 Accordingly, when a public distribution of securities is accomplished by
means of a misleading free writing prospectus that is widely distributed before a
complete section 10(a) prospectus is available, application of section 12(a)(2) to such a
free writing prospectus yields a liability scheme that works in much the same way that
section 11 once did.
Nonetheless, section 12(a)(2) liability substantially reduces the attractiveness of the
new communication vehicles, and does so needlessly in many circumstances. Free
writing prospectuses should not be subject to section 12(a)(2) unless they are broadly
disseminated before a final section 10(a) prospectus is available.' 70
167. Rule 15c2-8(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8(b) (2007).
168. See Rule 159, 17 C.F.R. § 230.159 (2007) (stating that for purposes of section 12(a)(2) "any
information conveyed to the purchaser only after such time of sale.., will not be taken into account").
169. Steve Choi's scheme of differentiating fraud remedies on the basis of issuer status suggests that
subjecting free writing prospectuses to section 12(a)(2) is not on the whole likely to serve investor interests,
particularly in the case of well-known seasoned issuers and issuers eligible to use Form S-3 registration
statements, both of which are afforded special treatment under the free writing prospectus rules. See Stephen J.
Choi, Company Registration: Toward a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 593 (1997)
(contending that "law makers should more explicitly take into account differences among companies in
constructing information safe harbors").
170. The SEC has previously exempted some documents used in connection with public offerings from
section 12(a)(2). Rules that exclude communications from the definition of offer or prospectus often have the
effect of excluding them from section 12(a)(2) as well. See, e.g., Rules 134a, 138, 139, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.134a,
230.138, 230.139 (2007) (excluding communication for the purposes of section 2(10) in Rule 134A, and
sections 2(a)(10) and 5(c) in Rules 138 and 139). But see Rule 134B, 17 C.F.R. § 230.134B (2007) (excluding
communication only for purposes of section 5(b)). Similarly, by expanding the information that may be
included in an identifying statement, Rule 134, 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (2007), effectively insulates
communications containing that information from section 12(a)(2). See supra note 70 (explaining that
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The justification for excepting free writing from section 12(a)(2) does not apply
perfectly to free writing prospectuses. The genius of excepting free writing from section
12(a)(2) was that doing so encouraged issuers and underwriters to distribute section 10(a)
prospectuses. This consideration does not indicate that free writing prospectuses should
be excepted now. Given technological, regulatory, and market changes since 1933,
statutory prospectuses are readily available and there is no longer any need to push
offering participants to distribute them. Indeed, the SEC is now much less concerned with
getting statutory prospectuses distributed than it used to be. Thus one of the signal 2005
reforms was the implementation of an access equals delivery model, which provides that
in a variety of circumstances a statutory prospectus is deemed to have been delivered for
purposes of the Securities Act if it is on file with the Commission. 1
71
While improvements in communication have undermined the incentive side of the
justification for exempting free writing from section 12(a)(2), they have strengthened the
other side of the justification for exempting free writing, and free writing prospectuses as
well. Precisely because information is so widely available and registration statements so
easily accessible, investors do not need the protection of section 12(a)(2) for isolated
communications or communications broadly disseminated after a complete section 10(a)
prospectus has been filed. In 1933 it was safe to except free writing from section 12(a)(2)
because of the availability of alternative sources of information (the delivered section
10(a) prospectus) and alternative remedies for misleading free writing. 172 Now section
10(a) prospectuses are readily available even if they are not delivered, in recognition of
which the SEC no longer bothers to require them to be delivered even when it can.
Moreover, the remedies of 1933 are now supplemented by the private action under Rule
lOb-5.173
Once a complete and final section 10(a) prospectus is available, it is at least as
safe-and appropriate-to exempt free writing prospectuses from section 12(a)(2) now as
identifying statements are not prospectuses and are therefore exempt from section 12(a)(2)). The Commission
has also exempted communications directly. Regulation A permits certain issuers to offer their securities
publicly without registration. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2007). It also permits them to test the waters prior to
preparing an offering statement by, among other things, distributing written documents to determine whether
investors are interested in their securities. Such written documents are deemed not to be prospectuses, Rule
254(e), 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(e), and accordingly are not subject to section 12(a)(2). See Additional Small
Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6950, Exchange Act Release No. 30,969, 51 SEC Docket 2273
(July 30, 1992) (explaining the "test the water" provision); see also Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at
44,741 n.169 (explaining the relationship between section 2(a)(10) and section 12(a)(2) liability); Solicitations
of Interest Prior to an Initial Public Offering, Securities Act Release No. 7188, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,648, 35,651
(July 10, 1995) (same). In 1995, the SEC proposed to permit testing the waters in registered offerings, and
proposed that such testing communications would be deemed not to be prospectuses and thus not subject to
section 12(a)(2). Solicitations of Interest Prior to an Initial Public Offering, supra, at 35,651-52.
171. See Rules 153, 172, 173, 174, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.153, 230.172, 230.173, 230.174 (2007) (noting the
variety of circumstances); Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at 44,782-86.
172. See discussion supra Part I1I.B (discussing Congress's wise decision to exempt free writing from
section 12(a)(2)).
173. The string of decisions restricting liability under section 12(a)(2), culminating in the Supreme Court's
decision in Gustafson, probably reflect nothing more than judicial insistence that the judicially created
limitations on Rule lOb-5 actions should apply to all private securities law claims. See Steve Thel, Section 12(2)
of the Securities Act Does Old Legislation Matter?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1183 (1995) (stating that the Court
has generally limited the relief available to private plaintiffs for Rule 1Ob-5 violations).
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it was to exempt free writing in 1933. Moreover, in many public offerings delivery of a
section 10(a) prospectus is an empty formality anyway, inasmuch as it consists of little
more than a statement that the issuer's filings under the Securities Exchange Act are
incorporated by reference.1 74 Accordingly, the SEC should extend its access equals
delivery model to free writing. Once a registration statement is effective and a final
section 10(a) prospectus is available, a free writing prospectus should be exempt from
section 12(a)(2), even if the recipient is not sent a section 10(a) prospectus first.
Even before a section 10(a) prospectus is available, free writing prospectuses that
are not broadly disseminated should also be exempt from section 12(a)(2). 175 Whatever
good is accomplished by subjecting free writing prospectuses to section 12(a)(2) liability,
doing so undeniably constrains communication and imposes costs on those seeking to
raise capital. 176 One of these costs is the denial of information to investors, but a more
important one may be the expense that issuers and other market participants incur to
avoid sending anyone a free writing prospectus. The risk of inadvertently sending a free
writing prospectus is great, inasmuch as even an isolated e-mail message or letter sent to
a potential investor during a public offering may be a prospectus. The Commission
recognized this in the 2005 reforms when it adopted rules excluding a variety of issuer
communications from the definition of offer. 17 By establishing that such
communications are not offers, the Commission immunized them from section 12(a)(2)
even when they are written. However, the Commission also recognized that these reforms
did not go far enough, and that they left communications overly restricted, especially
during the offering process. 7 8 Once the offering process begins, offering participants go
to great lengths to avoid inadvertently publishing a prospectus. Permitting the use of free
writing prospectuses was supposed to prevent this wasted expense. However, the short
history of the reforms has already shown that the threat of section 12(a)(2) liability
constrains the use of free writing prospectuses. This constraint is costly and the cost is
unproductive. If markets are now efficient enough to assume-as the SEC does-that
investors get the advantages of registration statements without seeing them, there is no
reason to impose section 12(a)(2) liability on the basis of misrepresentations in free
writing prospectuses that are not broadly disseminated.1
79
As the Commission noted when it adopted its 2005 reforms, many commentators
had expressed concern about the burden of section 12(a)(2) liability on free writing
174. See supra note 42 (discussing form S-3).
175. The Commission's rules themselves distinguish between free writing prospectuses that are used in a
manner reasonably designed to lead to "broad unrestricted dissemination" and those that are not. Rule
433(d)(1)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(d)(1)(ii) (2007) (describing filing requirements).
176. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (explaining the motivation to make sellers careful about
what they say).
177. See Rules 163A, 168, 169, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.163A, 230.168, 230.169 (2007) (specifying the excluded
issuer communications).
178. See Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at 44,744 (noting that communications were still
restricted).
179. A former SEC Commissioner has forcefully challenged the use of abbreviated prospectuses for the
sale of mutual fund securities, but he emphasizes that the efficient market hypothesis is inapplicable to mutual
fund transactions. See Bevis Longstreth, The Profile: Designer Disclosure for Mutual Funds, 64 BROOK. L.
REV. 1019, 1032-33 (1998) (asserting that the efficient market hypothesis cannot extend to mutual funds
because there is no active trading market).
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prospectuses.5 0 In response to such concerns, the Commission modified its proposed
rules to limit the liability of some offering participants for false statements in free writing
prospectuses used by other participants.1 8 ' Notwithstanding this change, when the 2005
offering reforms were adopted, securities lawyers warned their clients that free writing
prospectuses would be subject to section 12(a)(2) liability, i8 2 and lawyers and other
commentators recognized that offering participants would reasonably fear to use the
newly permitted vehicle and would not use free writing prospectuses unless they were
prepared with the same care and diligence theretofore associated with statutory
prospectuses. 183
Since the reforms were adopted, issuers and especially underwriters have been
cautious in using free writing prospectuses for fear of section 12(a)(2) liability. 84
180. Securities Offering Reform, supra note 1, at 44,749, 44,759-60,44,766-70.
181. See Rule 159A(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.159A(b) (2007) (stating such specifications); Securities Offering
Reform, supra note 1, at 44,725, 44,759 (discussing comments and changes made in response thereto); see also
id. at 44,766-68 (providing guidance on section 12(a)(2) liability in response to comments).
182. See, e.g., Memorandum from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP to Clients (July 29, 2005),
http://www.adrbny.com/files/SO6544.pdf ("The free writing prospectus is subject to prospectus liability under
Securities Act § 12(a)(2) for the user .... ").
183 See, e.g., Jonas A. Marson, Surfing the Web for Capital: The Regulation of Internet Securities
Offerings, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 281, 304 (2000) (discussing the requirement that all
free writing be filed with the SEC); Alexander F. Cohen, Latham & Watkins, Public Offering Reform in the
United States, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Sept. 2005) ("It remains to be seen whether underwriters will embrace
the use of free writing prospectuses. We expect that underwriters will seek to have a significant voice in the
decision to release any free writing prospectus during the offering process."); Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge,
Impact of the SEC's Securities Offering Reform Rules on Small and Medium Sized Public Companies,
http://www.eapdlaw.com/files/News/56c4l Ic-5a 1c-4bc4-a5 ff-
9e4847c3d2dd/Presentation/NewsAttachment/96d68b29-838c-41 cf-9eeO-
9e87fc366db8/SEC%2OSecurities%200ffering%2OReform%20(00246940-5).pdf ("[It remains to be seen how
much the professionals in the offering process, especially the underwriters, will want issuers to make use of the
newly permitted flexibility for free writing prospectuses."); Memorandum from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP to
Clients (Aug. 2, 2005), http://wwww.adrbny.com/files/SO6747.pdf
([Free writing prospectuses] are subject to filing with the SEC under many circumstances and
will in all cases be subject to liability for material misstatements and misleading statements.
Thus, it remains to be seen whether and to what extent issuers and underwriters will use these
additional written communications and, if they are used, how offering participants might control
the content of those written communications.);
see also id. at 7 ("One practical effect of [Rule 159, 17 C.F.R. § 230.159 (2007)] may be an increased
emphasis on earlier due diligence .... The response of issuers and underwriters to this new rule may act
as a 'speed bump' in some offerings.").
184 See Pinedo & Tanenbaum, supra note 121, at 15 ("[M]arket particiants have been reluctant to use free-
writing prospectuses to convey information that is not 'routine' or 'pricing information,' given their concerns
about liability."); Rachel McTague, Goldman Sachs Managing Director Says Underwriters' Liability for 'FWP'
Unclear, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA), Nov. 14, 2006 (describing how a Goldman Sachs managing director said
underwriters were not clear regarding liability for free writing prospectus); Rachel McTague, Issuers' Offering
Practices Changing Under New Rules, SEC. L. DAILY (BNA), Jan. 25, 2006 (explaining issuer resistance to
underwriter free writing prospectuses); TODD W. ECKLAND ET AL., PRACTICAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE
FIRST 100 DAYS OF SECURITIES OFFERING REFORM 2 (2006) ("Although the practice on free writing
prospectuses has varied from deal to deal, the most common approach has been a mutual covenant by the issuer
and the underwriters not to use a free writing prospectus without the other party's consent, with certain
exceptions for 'electronic road shows'-which continue to be common practice .... "), available at
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Underwriting agreements for public offerings now typically bind all parties not to use
free writing prospectuses without the consent of the other parties except for the now near-
universal final term sheet, and possibly others in narrow circumstances. By and large, the
only free writing prospectuses being widely used are term sheets, computational data for
asset-backed securities and electronic roadshows, and, less often, documents highlighting
changes made to the preliminary prospectus after the offering began. Market participants
would use free writing prospectuses much more often if they were not subject to liability
under section 12(a)(2). Permitting them to do so would reduce the cost of raising capital
at no cost to the investing public.
V. CONCLUSION
Any discussion of section 12(a)(2) takes place in the shadow of Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co. 185 Simply put, the Supreme Court's opinion in that case is the worst securities law
opinion ever written. The fact that Justices Thomas, Scalia, Ginsburg and Breyer joined
in dissent is evidence enough that something was wrong. The opinion has been broadly
and uniformly criticized, and even the few commentators who approved of the result have
had nothing good to say about the opinion. 186 A student writer's reaction to Gustafson
was typical, if colorful:
The Court's wholly unprecedented construction of the 1933 Act ... is riddled
with profound inconsistencies that reflect the Court's policy-driven desire to
preempt a more extensive use of section 12[(a)](2) rather than any real attempt
to offer a coherent reading of the 1933 Act. Moreover, the Court's overbroad
reasoning may have severe and unintended consequences both within and
beyond the narrow context of section 12[(a)](2). "7
Gustafson is incoherent, so it is impossible to say just how much it changed the law,
or precisely what the law now is. Nonetheless, the majority may have come close to
recognizing what Congress was trying to accomplish with section 12(a)(2). To be sure,
there is no justification for the Court's conclusion that written offering material used in a
privately negotiated transaction is not a prospectus within the meaning of section
12(a)(2), but what is done is done. Be that as it may, the Court was right to note the
troubling implications of applying section 12(a)(2) to isolated and "casual
http://www.pillsburylaw.com/content/portal/publications/2006/3/200631082115543/Securities.Corp%20&2OSe
c%20Vol%200804%2ONo%208050%2003-10-06.pdf.
185. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
186. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss, Some Further Thoughts on Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 137,
141 (1996) (expressing concern about the reasoning the Court used in Gustafson).
187. Leading Cases, Civil Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 109 HARV. L. REV.
329, 329 (1995). Elliot Weiss, who had been the leading academic advocate for restricting the scope of section
12(a)(2), collected a few other notable responses:
Stephen Bainbridge described Gustafson as "the most poorly-reasoned, blatantly results-driven
securities opinion in recent memory."... Simon M. Lome, general counsel of the SEC, pointed out
that "[i]f the decision is more than result-determined, its implications are difficult for those who
daily need to interpret the statute." Ted Fiflis noted that "[t]he reasoning used by the majority ... is
so flawed that its full implication will not be known for some time."
Weiss, supra note 186, at 141 (footnotes omitted).
2008]
The Journal of Corporation Law
communications,"'' 8  as distinct from communications intended to be widely
disseminated. When Congress exempted free writing from section 12(a)(2), it recognized
and attempted to minimize the cost of punishing incidental communications that
negligently include false statements, especially when the recipient has also been provided
a carefully prepared formal document that contains the truth. If private transactions are
now off the table, Gustafson may have some enduring value if it limits section 12(a)(2)
liability to widely disseminated documents, 8 9 such as statutory prospectuses, formal
offering documents used in public offerings of exempt securities, and brokerage-firm
recommendations dealing with securities already trading in the public markets.
1 90
False or misleading written offering material is subject to sanction under numerous
provisions of state and federal law in proceedings brought by investors and government
agencies. After a registration statement has become effective, however, written offering
material accompanied or preceded by a statutory prospectus-free writing-is not
actionable under section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act. Since 2005, the SEC has
permitted offering participants to use many new forms of written offering material in
connection with a public offering, and to do so before the registration statement becomes
effective. However, it has insisted that these newly permitted materials-free writing
prospectuses-be subject to section 12(a)(2) liability. This insistence is misguided and
counterproductive. The Commission should exempt free writing prospectuses from
liability under section 12(a)(2) unless they are broadly disseminated before a section
188 Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 578.
189. The Court's discussion of section 2(a)(10) of the Securities Act suggests that the scope of section
12(a)(2) depends on the public nature of the communication (as opposed to the transaction) at issue:
From the terms "prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, [or] letter," it is apparent that the list
refers to documents of wide dissemination. In a similar manner, the list includes communications
"by radio or television," but not face-to-face or telephonic conversations. Inclusion of the term
"communication" in that list suggests that it too refers to a public communication.
When the 1933 Act was drawn and adopted, the term "prospectus" was well understood to refer
to a document soliciting the public to acquire securities from the issuer. See Black's Law
Dictionary 959 (2d ed. 1910) (defining "prospectus" as a "document published by a company.. . or
by persons acting as its agents or assignees, setting forth the nature and objects of an issue of shares
... and inviting the public to subscribe to the issue").... The use of the term prospectus to refer to
public solicitations explains as well Congress' decision in § 12(2) to grant buyers a right to rescind
without proof of reliance. See H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1933) ("The statements
for which [liable persons] are responsible, although they may never actually have been seen by the
prospective purchaser, because of their wide dissemination, determine the market price of the
security .... ).
... [T]he term "written communication" must be read in context to refer to writings that, from a
functional standpoint, are similar to the terms "notice, circular, [and] advertisement." The term
includes communications held out to the public at large but that might have been thought to be
outside the other words in the definitional section.
Id. at 575-76 (emphasis added). This language presumably motivated the Commission's declaration, in Rule
433(a), that "a free writing prospectus ... will, for purposes of considering it a prospectus, be deemed to be
public, without regard to its method of use or distribution, because it is related to the public offering of
securities that are the subject of a filed registration statement." 17 C.F.R. § 433(a) (2007).
190. But cf Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991) (pre-Gustafson case
holding, in the context of an oral misrepresentation by a broker, that section 12(a)(2) does not apply to
aftermarket transactions).
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